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A CRITIQUE OF "THE MARASMUS OF THE ICC:
THE COMMISSION, THE RAILROADS, AND THE
PUBLIC INTERESTI*
CHARLES S. ,MORGA1I"
CONSTRUCTIVE criticism of the work of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion requires a thoroughly objective approach and intimate understanding
of what the Commission does and of the reasons for its actions. The magni-
tude and complexity of the Commission's activities create a formidable task
for anyone who would sit in judgment. While criticism of public agencies
is a prerogative of any qualified citizen, these comments will demonstrate
that Dr. Huntington's article in the JoURNAL. "The 'Marasmus of the ICC:
The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest," reflects none of the
qualifications needed for helpful criticism but rather is an effort to prove a
thesis at whatever cost to the facts.
The Thesis
Dr. Huntington's thesis may be summarized as follows: The Commission
has fallen from its high estate as the "prenier federal agency in the trans-
portation field" and now is in danger of elimination or reduction to a
secondary position. The responsiblity for this "marasmus"1 lies in its failure
to "adjust its sources of support so as to correspond with changes in the
strength of their political pressures,"2 or, stated otherwise, in its "continued
dependence upon railroad support." The Commission was created and given
strong powers to bring the railroads to task in the interest of farmers and other
shippers. It reached its peak of power and prestige in the decade following
passage of the Hepburn Act (1906) "while still dependent upon consumer, pub-
lic, and presidential support." Thereafter, following passage of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920, it turned more and more to the railroads for support and ex-
pansion of its powers. In a period which has seen dynamic changes in trans-
portation, it "remains primarily a 'railroad' agency," unresponsive to the
demands of the new forces in transportation. The successful adjustment it
made after 1920 has not been duplicated in later years. "Consequently, it
*An article in 61 YAaE L.J. 467-509 (April, 1952) by Samuel P. Huntington, In-
structor in Government, Harvard University (hereinafter cited as Huntington).
' Chief carrier research analyst, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
1. "A gradual and continuous wasting away of the bulk of the body from some
morbid cause." Fuim & ,VAG.x.Ls, Nm'w STA.-D.AR DicrioiARY oF T m Er.NGLsr
LANGUAGE (1935).
2. Huntington, p. 470.
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is losing its leadership to those agencies which are more responsive to the
needs and demands of the times."3
This "pattern of affiliation of the Commission with the railroads" has
resulted in the alienation of non-railroad interest groups and of other Govern-
ment agencies, has led to subversion of the intent of Congress, and has
resulted in "passivity and loss of leadership."
". ... When such a commission loses its objectivity and im-
partiality by becoming dependent upon the support of a single nar-
row interest group, obviously the rationale for maintaining its
independence has ceased to exist, and it becomes necessary to
subordinate this agency to some other agency possessing a broader
outlook and a broader basis of political support ...
"The Interstate Commerce Commission should be abolished as
an independent agency. Its executive functions should be trans-
ferred, as the Hoover Commission recommended, to the Secretary of
Commerce. The motor and water carriers should be emancipated
by dividing the regulatory functions of the ICC among three separate
commissions dealing respectively with rail, water, and highway trans-
portation. These three commissions should all be placed within the
Department of Commerce in a position similar to that of the Mari-
time Board and subject to the same general policy guidance of the
Secretary." 4
The author's presentation of this thesis has the earmarks of disinterested
scholarship and may have received some acceptance. The present writer
therefore has considered it necessary to bring together facts which confute
the author's remarkable thesis and show the unrealistic and harmful nature
of his recommendations.
5
Basic Facts and Considerations
Certain basic matters which bear on the issues raised in the paper need
first to be noted. The year 1935 was the beginning of a new era in the
Commission's work. Theretofore, it had regulated railroads primarily. The
adverse effects of uncontrolled motor transportation on motor carriers them-
selves and on railroads, shippers, and the public were becoming more and
more evident in the Twenties and Thirties. The Commission advocated the
extension of regulation to this field, and it understood how large a task it
was assuming when Congress placed many thousands of motor carriers
under its jurisdiction in 1935.6 Its work load and problems were augmented
when it received greater jurisdiction over water carriers in 1940 and when
3. Huntington, p. 473.
4. Huntington, pp. 508-9.
5. These comments, prepared in response to an inquiry directed to the writer by an
editor of the JOURNAL, are offered in a personal capacity and solely on the responsibility
of the writer. To meet limitations of space, some subjects have been passed over entirely
or treated very briefly.
6. See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REGULATION OF TRANSroRTATION
AGEciEs, SENr. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-32 (1934).
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freight forwarders first came directly under its jurisdiction in 1942. It regu-
lates about 22,000 carriers; in addition, many thousands of exempt and
private interstate motor carriers are subject to its safety and hours-of-
service regulations, and there are many special duties.
With the possible exception of pipe lines, each mode of transportation
or carrier is engaged in a competitive struggle, often carried to extremes,
and each naturally desires to win its points before the Commission. No
agency has such diverse and complex regulatory responsibilities; yet, as
will be shown, this concentration of authority is completely necessary. The
administrative process followed is a democratic one. Every person receives
a fair and open trial, though delays result for which the Commission is
criticized in some quarters. It is not unnatural that other criticisms occur,
but Dr. Huntington is on very weak ground in generally identifying such
criticisms with Commission error. The ends each mode of transportation or
each carrier seeks to attain by fault-finding tactics are largely self-serving.
Out of this competitive array of interests, however, the Commission must
try to find the true public interest on the basis of the facts as developed on
an open record and under a law which necessarily leaves much to Com-
mission discretion.
The burdens imposed on the Commission by competitive conditions are
increased by the great variety of factual contexts in which competition
takes place. The railroads, performing the largest single transportation task,
for many years have been facing widespread, aggressive motor and other
competition. This rivalry is the more difficult to deal with because of the great
number of motor carriers, from relatively large to very small, with their
diverse characteristics. Like the railroads, a good many carriers undertake
to handle all traffic within their capabilities, but some do not provide a complete
common-carrier service; others are specialists. Contract carriers, by their
nature are subject to less comprehensive regulation. In addition, both
regulated motor carriers and railroads face the actual or potential com-
petition of shipper-operated transportation, while vast and growing areas of
exempt motor transport create further harassments. Water transportation
exhibits similar variation in size of carriers, degree of specialization, and
carrier status. Some of its branches, in difficulty prior to Commission regu-
lation and feeling the further effects of wartime cessation of operations, now
find themselves the high-cost carriers. Yet other branches are in sound
condition. Again, exemptions and private carriage are large factors.
Users of various transport services also bring many, often very seriuus,
problems before the Commission. For example, increases in rate levels
affect long- and short-haul shippers differently, and continual allegations
of unjust discrimination occur. The recently accelerated industrial develop-
ment of certain regions was inspired partly by higher rates on shipments
from or to other regions; this development in turn has imposed new pressures
upon those engaged in making such shipments. And shippers' ability to operate
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as private carriers adds to the problems of for-hire carriers and other
shippers.
This competitive picture constitutes only a partial source of the problems
brought before the Commission from day to day. Advances in costs create
other problems. All are expected to be handled fairly and openly, as ex-
peditiously as possible, and in observance of the terms of the Act and the
complex and challenging statement found in the congressional declaration of
transportation policy. In view of this difficult assignment-more recently
coupled with a fund shortage resulting from the drive for economy in
government spending-it is perhaps obvious to say that not every decision
of the Commission has proved a wise one. In what follows, therefore, it is to
be understood that the present writer does not assume that the Commission
is above error. No human institution has attained such a status.
The errors to be discussed in the Huntington paper may be grouped
reasonably well under four major heads: failure to understand Commis-
sion administration of statutory standards; failure to go beyond the form of
things to the underlying economic conditions; failure to recognize the place
of the independent commission; and incorrect conclusions as to technical
procedural and administrative matters. The question of the Commission's
"viability" then will be turned to, after which a few remarks will be offered
as to the author's proposed new regulatory setup.
FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND COMMISSION ADMINISTRATION OF
STATUTORY STANDARDS
Before and After 1920-The General Picture
Prior to 1920, according to the article, the Commission was concerned
primarily with the advancement of shipper interests; since 1920, its nmain
concern has been with the welfare of the railroads.
It is true that Federal regulation was enacted in 1887 and strengthened
in 1906 and 1910 essentially in response to shipper demands; but it was
obvious in 1887 that regulation, so far as it succeeded, also would tend to
save the railroads from their own efforts to destroy one another.7 It like-
wise is true that the Commission did not readily permit general increases
in rates from 1911 to 1917. Simply stated, it was not convinced in some
instances that the evidence, including the showing as to carriers' financial
condition, justified increases. The railroads in 1911 were endeavoring to
discover what they could get out of the revamped Act. The Commission
could not overlook various financial practices which subsequent legislation
and regulation were to end. It was skeptical of railroad investment accounts
as a rate base and sought authority to make a valuation.8 The fact is, how-
7. 53 ICC ANN. REP. 24 (1939).
8. 17 ICC ANN. PrzP. 26 (1903). First sought in 1903, the Valuation Act was
passed in 1913. Results of this work were used first in Increased Rates, 1920, 58 I.C.C.
220, 227-30 (1920).
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ever, that the increases granted in 1914 and after were not "only a minor
fraction" of those requested, for the Commission knew full well the rights
of the carriers under the law and the importance of adequate arningsP
The inference that, as a matter of policy, it considered primarily shipper
needs is therefore mistaken.'
0
Costs increased while the railroads were making their vital contribution
in World WVar I, and there definitely was a "railroad problem" when the
time came to resume private operation. At that time there was little motor
competition, and water competition was not extensive. The Transportation
Act of 1920 sought by various means (consolidation, control of security
issues, etc.) to strengthen the rail industry and enable it to improve service.
The author points out only some of the essentials of this legislation and fails
to note that it also represented shipper interests. 1 The Act provided, for
the first time, specific statutory affirmation of the judicially-recognized right
of railroads to a fair return on the value of property they devoted to the
public service. The Commission was directed to initiate or adjust rates to
provide such a return "as nearly as may be."
The statement that the Commission "inmediately prior to [World War 1]
had eliminated the worst discriminatory practices" probably can be ac-
cepted, but the further observation that these "vigorous actions" had "re-
duced the interest and political activity of shipper groups" is not entitled to
great weight- 2 The Commission's decisions over the years indicate that
shipper interest is, in fact, extensive. Moreover, shipper influence on legisla-
tion dearly continues to be substantial. But the nub of the matter is that
the Commission was concerned not with its "viability" but with the law as
it stood in 1920 and after. The law obviously comprehends the rights of
shippers as well as those of the railroads. In the face of this statutory policy,
the author must assume a very heavy burden of proof when he uses such
expressions as "turning more and more to the railroad industry."
9. See the notable decision in Advances in Rates-Western District, 20 I.C.C. 307,
379 (1911). Language there used would have fitted some later decisions.
10. The careful analysis of the 1911-17 decisions made by Professor L L. Sharfman,
in THE INTERSTATE, COMMEECE ConnnssioN, III-B, 33-4S (1936), led him to conclude
that the early decisions were sound from both a legal and an economic standpoint and
that there was a lack of boldness in dealing with the emerging difficulties of the war
period. There is no indication in his analysis that the Commission put shipper above
railroad interests. The present writer may add that knowledge of price behaviors and
of means of forecasting earnings was rudimentary in those days compared with what it
since has become.
11. See Hearings before Secmate Committee on Interstate Corgmmerce oil Extcnsion
of Te-,ure of Governiment Control of Railroads, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919). See testi-
mony of the witnesses Rich and Freer, id. at 704-33, 1183-89. Some shipper oppasition
was against features which did not get into the legislation.
12. See, e.g., the author's ovn discussion of farm group opposition to rate increases
in the Twenties and his reference to the Hoch-Smith Resolution (1925). Huntington,
p. 482.
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Rail-Motor Competition
A long indictment must be analyzed to the extent space permits. Its per-
vasive theme is that the Commission's rate and other policies have consistently
favored railroads over motor competitors.
Rate-makhig procedures. The author's own analysis serves to show how
highly competitive our transportation system is. The essence of any competi-
tive regime is the right of producers to initiate price changes. This primary
right is provided for by the Act and recognized by the courts. 18 The Act,
in fact, presupposes use of this right, and it is exercised extensively.
1 4
Exercise of the right is subject, of course, to the requirement that the rates
as changed do not violate the Act; and the right is at times subject to
minimum or maximum prescribed rates. Carriers and shippers are not de-
barred, however, from requesting changes in such minima or maxima.
In the case of some large rate adjustments, in fact, departures from the
reasonable maximum level are the rule rather than the exception." Between
maximum and minimum rate limits there is room for reductions or increases,
and they are common. Every rate move taken by a carrier or a group of
carriers may be protested by other carriers or by shippers, and such protests
may result in suspension of the proposed change. Or the Commission, on
its own motion, may act to suspend. After investigation, the proposal is
approved or disapproved, and sometimes disapproval is accompanied by an
indication of what an acceptable rate would be. Carriers are free, however,
to put rates into effect at the end of seven months, the maximum statutory
suspension period. This, then, is the general framework within which rate
changes are made.
The decline of value-of-service criteria. Railroad rates formerly reflected the
influence of value-of-service consideration more than they do now. Rates
were relatively high on better grades of traffic, on shorter hauls, or both,
because this traffic could pay the price; high rates thus lost little volume.
Revenue from these rates helped to make possible low rates on traffic for
which low rates were crucial. The resulting distribution of the burden of
supporting the railroads was regarded as generally equitable and economic-
ally sound. This setup, however, provided a rich vein of traffic whose
relatively high rail rates made it ripe for tapping by motor carriers with
13. See, e.g., Lumber from Pac. Coast to Eastern Ports, 210 I.C.C. 317, 345 (1935),
in which the Commission cited United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 515, 522
(1924), and ICC v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 209 U.S. 108, 118 (1908). In the latter case
the Supreme Court reminded the Commission that railroads are private property and
that the Commission is not a general manager."
14. Some indication is provided by the fact that tariff filings of all kinds averaged
550 each working day in a recent twelve-month period. 65 ICC A,;N. RE,. 137 (1951).
15. E.g., the adjustment of rail rates on cotton in Rate Structure Investigation, Part
3, Cotton, 165 I.C.C. 595 (1930), and in supplementary decisions never became fully
effective and came to be used less and less because of truck competition.
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their faster and more complete service, if not lower rates. Reduction of the
higher rates was thus natural and necessary for the railroads,17 and within
their legal right. And as many of the higher rates were materially above
costs on any reckoning basis, reductions could be substantial without bring-
ing the rates to an unduly low level.18 The period covered by the author's
criticism of railroad rate reductions falls within this period of partial dissolu-
tion of the value-of-service criterion in railroad rates. The notion that any
cut below the level of maximum reasonable rates is an unfair competitive
practice, which appears to underlie much of the author's reasoning, is un-
sound on economic grounds and in terms of any carrier's legal rights.
Burden of proof. The charge here is that from 1937 to 1940 motor carriers,
but not railroads, had to justify rate reductions, even though a 1938 amend-
ment made the burden-of-proof provisions identical for the two carrier
groups. Actually, until 1940 the statute required neither group to justify
reductions; the 1938 change concerned increases and merely harmonized the
rail and the motor carrier provisions. It is true that from 1937 to 1940 the
motor carrier division disallowed reductions on lack of evidence that the
rates would be compensatory, 19 but, as shown by the protests, it acted with
the welfare of motor carriers in mind. Railroads long had been supplying
data to justify reductions.
Minimum rate orders. In the author's view, the comprehensive orders
(entered in the Northeast and Middle West) prescribing minimum motor
carrier rates, while initially requested by the motor carriers, subsequently
made rate reductions much more difficult for such carriers than for railroads.
But the purpose of the orders-prevention of destructive competition--ob-
viously would have been defeated by greater liberality in allowing reductions.
Moreover, shippers had an interest in stable motor rates. The Commission
did enter many supplementary orders which, as fast as possible, granted or
denied requests for relief from the orders.2 ° The essential question is whether
the orders were removed as soon as they became unnecessary.2 ' The Com-
mission had no desire to maintain the orders, and, despite motor carrier
objections, termination took place as soon as practicable.
16. See 53 ICC ANN. REP. 25-7 (1939).
17. See Locklin, Rates and Rate Structures in NATUrA L REso RCES PLA.&1:zr Bo.VA,
TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 106 (1942).
18. 53 ICC ANN. REP. 26-7 (1939).
19. See Rates over Carpet City Trucking, 4 M.C.C. 5S9, 593 (193S); Rates of
Lambert Transfer, 3 M.C.C. 651 (1937). See also Consolidated Freight Co., Commodi-
ties from Flint, Mich., 21 M.C.C. 329, 331 (1940).
20. Thus, in Central Territory Rates, 8 M.C.C. 131 (1933), thirty-nine supple-
mentary reports, some covering a great many individual rates, had buzen entered by
October 10, 1941. Where there were no protests, action vas very prompt. Vhere neces-
sary, the Commission even aided carriers in making appropriate filings.
21. 57 ICC ANN. RFP. 97-8 (1943).
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The statement that the Commission's action "in these cases was in sharp
contrast to its normal policy in rail cases" raises the question of whether
the orders were needed. Cited, among others, are decisions in which the
Commission refused to set rail rate minima,2 2 stating in one decision that its
minimum rate power "should be sparingly exercised and only in cases where
it clearly appears that its exercise is necessary in order that substantial public
injury may be avoided. ' ' Statements in these decisions still hold true.
There was no pressing emergency in the rail cases; only a small fraction of
the carriers' traffic was involved. Many of the motor carriers, however,
were operating at a loss, and the admonition in the Sugar Cases that manage-
ments should try to compose their differences 24 had not yielded results,
Congress in 1935 directed the Commission to prevent destructive competitidn
in motor transportation; similar legislation in 1920 had concerned rail-
road rates. In both fields, broad use of the minimum rate power is resorted
to only when there is no alternative. Treatment of motor and rail groups
differed only where conditions in the motor field required drastic, emergency
action to save the industry.
25
Comipetitive rate adjustments. "Throughout this period t 1935-40] the Com-
mission in a number of cases encouraged the railroads to exercise their
managerial discretion by meeting motor carrier competition through various
devices." 26 The reference to "managerial discretion" is significant. So long
as the means are lawful-4.e., so long as the rates as reduced are reasonably
compensatory, are no lower than necessary to meet the competition, and (to
not result in undue preference or unjust discrimination or the breakdown of
a reasonable rate structure-the carriers are within their rights in effecting
reductions. In 1935 the railroads sought to increase their rates. The Com-
mission viewed the requested increases as "an inadequate and dangerous
method of meeting these new problems" 27 of increased competition. Greater
study should be given, it said, to the revenue effects of changes in particular
rates and to other ways of increasing net earnings. Contrary to the author's
"affiliation" doctrine, the Commission, basically critical of rail efforts to
increase rates during the depression period, granted less than the increases
requested, and then on only a temporary basis.28 It was concerned not only
with the need for increased net earnings but also with the justness and reason-
22. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81 I.C.C. 448 (1923); Ex-Lake Iron Ore from Chicago
to Granite City, 123 I.C.C. 503 (1927). Cited in Huntington, p. 493 n.115,
23. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81 I.C.C. 448, 472 (1923).
24. Ibid.
25. Presumably, the author would be critical of extensive minimum rate orders
in water transportation. See Locklin, supra note 17, at 114, for an account of Maritime
Commission action as to westbound intercoastal rates.
26. Huntington, p. 493.
27. Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 208 I.C.C. 4, 62 (1935).
28. See cases cited in Huntington, p. 483 n.72. It was not until 1938 that a ten
percent increase was allowed.
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ableness of the rates as proposed to be increased. The Commission was not
hostile to other modes of transportation, regulated or not, though it would
have appreciated more adequate cost and other data from these sources. The
basic consideration, however, is that the railroads had the legal right to
adjust their rates to the new competitive conditions. The Commission's
admonitions called for such downward adjustments rather than for a policy
of shifting the burden of increased costs to shippers. Its attitude was in the
public interest.
"The injurious effects of proposed railroad competitive rates upon motor
carrers were not sufficient cause to invalidate the rates."'  The decisions
cited doubtless are intended to develop a contrast in the treatment given rail
and motor rate reductions. Four of the eight decisions in the rail field have
no or very little bearing on the rail-motor rates. The others resulted in
letting reduced rail rates go in over motor carrier protests, but only after
findings that the rates would be reasonably compensatory and not in violation
of any provision of the Act. Private and buy-and-sell motor competition was
a factor in one of these cases. In another, the Commission stated that in-
ability of motor carriers to meet the rate and to operate profitably is "not
indicative of unlawfulness in and of itself,"2' 0 and in another it said: "The
fact that the effect may be to attract traffic now moving by other forms of
transportation is not of legal significance." 31 There is nothing in the Act
which requires the Commission to keep the rates of one mode or agency of
transportation at a level needed for the protection of another mode or agency.
This basic consideration, overlooked by the author, has been pointed out in
countless reports - 2 and has not been rejected by the courts. The right to
compete within reasonable limits is basic to the maintenance of an essentially
competitive regime in transportation.
The author then cites fourteen motor carrier decisions. The bearing of
some of them on the point is not at all clear. In most of the cases the reduc-
tions proposed were not allowed. In general, the requested rate cuts were
either opposed or only faintly supported by motor carriers. Most of the
proposals involved efforts of a single motor carrier or a few carriers to de-
29. Huntington, p. 493.
30. Mletals from Chicago to Detroit, 246 I.C.C. 350, 352 (1940).
31. Groceries from Boston to Me. & Vt., 248 I.C.C. 199, 202 (1941).
32. The decision in Petroleum between Washington, Oregon, Idaho & Montana, 234
I.C.C. 609 (1939), which the author seems to have misconstrued, was rendered prior to
the amendments of the rate-making rules of the various parts of the act in 1940. De-
cisions which reject "umbrella" rate making under the present wording of these rules
are numerous. See, e.g.. New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C.
475, 538-9 (1945) (rail-motor-water); Citrus Fruit from Florida to North Atlantic
Ports, 266 I.C.C. 627, 633-5 (1946) (rail-water); and Boots and Shoes from Boston,
Hartford, and New York, 42 M.C.C. 90, 93 (1943) (rail-motor). As a result of the
Petroleum decision, in fact, the bulk of the petroleum traffic involved moves by -water
in connection with trucks.
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velop traffic on a return-trip, out-of-pocket-cost basis at very low earnings
per ton- and truck-mile. Existing motor rate structures and motor carrier
earnings would have been jeopardized, contrary to Sections 202(a) and 216(b)
of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, with indirect effects on railroad rate struc-
tures as well. The Commission recognized that such decreased rates could
be allowed only if similarly low competitive rates had to be met. In short,
the unfavorable decisions reflected ill-conceived, even ignorant, efforts to
carry motor carrier competition to extremes, to the disadvantage of the in-
dustry. There is no evidence that the standards of reasonableness applied
were different from those used in the rail cases.
The author brings together another miscellany of decisions, very few of
which are later than 1942, in a further effort to show favored treatment of
railroads. A remark, obscured in a footnote, that "many" of the cases in
which reductions of motor rates were proposed "involved competition be-
tween motor carriers as well as between motor carriers and railroads,"13
substantially changes the color the author would give the decisions by his
criticisms. Generally, motor carriers were pitted against one another in these
cases. The motor competition varyingly involved not only other regulated
common carriers but also contract carriers and exempt, private, and intra-
state carriers. The principal reason for the denials was that the rates would
be noncompensatory ;34 many were justifiable, if at all, only on a back-haul
basis. Adequate cost data usually were lacking. The likelihood that other
carriers would counter with reductions meant that both motor and rail
carriers would suffer unnecessary revenue losses, and efforts to maintain rate
structures which lend strength to the motor carrier industry would be de-
feated.8 5 Not all of the cited cases, however, resulted in denials or complete
denials. The article does not pay adequate attention to cases in which reduc-
tions were approved or to the large number of reductions which become
effective without suspension. The railroads, more experienced in presenting
evidence, naturally fared better; they did not make proposals which obviously
had no chance of approval. Some of their proposals were coupled with increases
in carload minimums.
"ICC action in regard to the most heavily competitive commodities was
almost invariably favorable to railroads."3 0 Despite known losses, the rail-
roads fought to hold "the most competitive traffic": less-than-carload (L.C.L.).
It was not surprising that railroads made reductions in this period on this
vulnerable traffic; the alternative was to abandon most L.C.L. business to
trucks, with increased costs on what was left. Railroads as common carriers
33. Huntington, p. 495 n.124.
34. In Refrigerator Material, Memphis, Tenn., to Dayton, Ohio, 4 M.C.C. 187, 188
(1938), the proposed rate would have yielded only six cents a vehicle-mile.
35. See Locklin, supra note 17, at 114: "This [use of cost criteria] suggests that
rates prescribed by the Commission conform with the standards of normal competition."
36. Huntington, p. 495.
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have to provide L.C.L. service; they are faced, in fact, with continuing
shipper pressure for better service. Yet the trucks had taken away much of
the more desirable L.C.L. traffic, leaving the railroads with a dispropor-
tionate amount of undesirable "balloon" traffic and small-station business.
For railroads, it was thus a business necessity (as well as a legal right) to
try to stem the loss of desirable L.C.L. traffic by reducing rates and improv-
ing service. Reductions, however, must meet the tests of reasonableness.T
Various important proceedings now before the Commission involve the future
of certain L.C.L. rates.
A review of cases on "other highly competitive commodities," such as auto-
mobiles and petroleum products, would be incomplete without inclusion of
more recent decisions than the ones cited, which, with one exception, cover
1934-42. Several of the cited cases have been considered herein in other
connections.3 s
"The railroads during this period were frequently permitted to quote com-
petitive rates of a type denied to the motor carriers."ao Rails could set rates
on an added-cost basis (variable costs only), while their competitors' rates
were required to cover full costs (constant and variable costs). Railroads,
in fact, still put in some rates based on less than full costs.40 But the author's
discussion of this whole problem is oversimplified. There are essential differ-
ences in the economic characteristics of rail and motor carriers. Costs of
motor carriers are 90 percent or more variable with volume.4 ' Because of
this fact, together with the prevailing nature of competition, motor carriers
normally have an average operating ratio of about 93 to 95 percent; in other
words, five to seven cents of each revenue dollar stand between an operating
profit and an operating loss. A sudden increase in costs could vipe out this
37. See, e.g., All Commodities, L.C.L. between Me., Mass., & N.-., 255 I.C.C. 85,
91 (1942). As a result of the decision in Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 231 I.C.C. 513
(1951), the vast majority of L.C.L. rates are now maintained on a maximum reasonable
basis.
38. Cases are cited in Huntington, p. 496 nn.128, 129. The decision in Naval Stores
from Miss. to Gulf Ports, 235 I.C.C. 723 (1940), cited by the author as "typical,'
resulted in the Commission's permitting a reduction in rail rates over motor carrier pro-
tests without prescription of a minimum for the rail rates. Five Commissioners dis-
sented, one of whom said: "I am inclined to think, however, that in the future the
decision here made will be regarded as an anomaly. It is entirely at variance vith
previously well-considered decisions in which similar questions were presented." Id. at
741. The 1940 amendment of § 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act and similar word-
ing in other parts of the Act made it clear that the Commission should not fix rates in
such a -way as to protect one mode of transportation by setting the rates of another at
a level above costs. The Commission obviously retained jurisdiction over future
changes in the Naval Stores case rates.
39. Huntington, p. 496.
40. Such reductions generally result from other than motor competition.
41. See Towne, Variations in Percentage of Out-of-Pochet Costs in Connection
with Different Types of Carriers, 18 ICC Pamc'. J. 395, 400 (1951).
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margin; rate reductions could have a similar effect, particularly because the
high percentage of variable expense means that volume increases will not
effect substantial declines in unit costs. 42 And, in fact, any increase in volume
would tend to be temporary, for it would result in rate reductions by com-
peting carriers. These competing carriers, therefore, generally oppose pro-
posed reductions.
On the other hand, variable costs of railroads approximate only 80 per-
cent of the total. 4 Railroads' large fixed plants usually have much unused
capacity, and increased volume generally means that lower unit costs can be
achieved. Hence, rails can more readily reduce rates without endangering
net earnings. Within limits, shippers as a whole gain when railroads obtain
traffic at rates based on something over added or out-of-pocket costs, for
rails thereby can effect a contribution to their constant costs. 44 Railroad rates
competitive with motor transportation, however, generally do not go below
fully-distributed costs.
The Commission, in discussing the possibility of such rail reductions, also
has called attention to another significant difference between the two fields:
"The dangers are, if anything, even greater in the case of motor
carriers than in the case of railroads. An unbalanced condition of
truck traffic, because of the greater number of operators, is apt to
be somewhat of an individual matter. That is to say, the traffic of
one truck operator may preponderate in one direction, whereas that
of a competing operator may preponderate in the other. As between
operators, therefore, the application of the 'out-of-pocket' cost method
of making rates might well result in a break-down of the rates in
both directions." 45
To a lesser extent railroads also would suffer if the margin between rates
and out-of-pocket costs became too slim. The Commission has recognized
this danger to rail and motor carriers on many occasions, 40 and as a result
it imposes limitations on both rail and motor rate reductions. Moreover, the
Commission has said:
"It must frankly be recognized, however, that if the railroads are
hereafter to be allowed to apply this [out-of-pocket cost] theory in
competing with the trucks, the latter must fairly be allowed equal
leeway. To that extent it is possible that it may be necessary to
42. See Refrigerator Material, Memphis, Tenn., to Dayton, Ohio, 4 M.C.C. 187, 189
(1938).
43. See Towne, supra note 41, at 399-400.
44. See, e.g., LOCKLIN, EcoNo.xics OF TRANSPoRTATioN 133-8 (3d ed. 1947). A more
qualified view is found in HEALY, THE EcoNomxcs OF TRANS 0aTArToN 194-8 (1940).
45. Refrigerator Material case, supra note 34, at 189. See also Locklin, slupra note 17,
at 113.
46. E.g., Middle Atlantic States M.C. Conf., Inc. v. Central R.R. of N.J., 232 I.C.C. 381,
391 (1939) ; All Freight from Eastern Ports to the South, 251 I.C.C. 361, 367 (1942).
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reconsider the conclusion here reached in the light of subsequent
events."
'47
This principle has been applied in other cases.48
Another of Dr. Huntington's examples of alleged anti-motor discrimina-
tion involving competitive rates is the point that "[tlhe railroads were lier-
mitted to introduce volume minimum rates (rates applicable only to a mini-
mum volume larger than a carload or truckload); the same privilege was
denied to motor carriers."49 Actually, the use of multiple-car rates was cun-
demned in the ICC's first volume of decisions and continued tu be pro-
hibited :0 until fairly recently, when departures were permitted in a few
instances under special circumstances." l The Commission has felt that such
rates would work hardships on small shippers and encourge concentration
in industry. In any event, because of the nature of the competition or the
commodities, distances, and low rates involved, the few ICC grants of per-
mission to railroads are of no interest or concern to motor carriers.
Moreover, motor transport conditions are not favorable to volume mini-
mum rates. It is not recognizably cheaper to move two or three truckloads
from a plant in a day than to move one load. 2 There also are complicatiuns in
the enforcement of a rate to which, say, a 50,000-pound minimum applies. Yet
there are many motor classification ratings which apply on minimum amount-
up to 50,000 pounds or more, though in some territories there are no such
ratings and few commodity rates which provide for minima above the capacity
of the vehicles in use. The Commission will not necessarily condemn a
minimum above vehicle capacity; it tends to look at the reasonableness oi
the revenue per truck- or per ton-mile.
47. Refrigerator Material case, supra note 34, at 190.
48. E.g., Stoves, Alabama and Tennessee to Interstate Points, 4 M.C.C. 641, 649-9
(1933).
49. Huntington, pp. 496-7.
50. Paine Bros. & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 7 IC.C. 218 (1S97); Wells Lbr. Co. v.
Chicago, Al. & St. P. Ry., 38 I.C.C. 464 (1916).
51. The reduction, less than requested, allowed in Molasses from New Orleans, La.,
to Peoria and Pekin, Ill., 235 I.C.C. 485 (1939), was to prevent diversion to private barg.
transportation. Other examples include multiple-car rates on exceptionally long hauls of
heavy-moving bauxite ore from the Gulf to the Pacific northwest, put in during the war, and
coal from Arkansas and Oklahoma to St. Louis. Denials were made in Limestone to Bat-.o,
Rouge, 270 I.C.C. 584 (1948) ; Pig Lead from Brownsville, Tem., to Chicago and St. Louis,
280 I.C.C 585 (1951) ; Petroleum Products from Salt Lake City to Spokane, 273 I.Co..
736 (1949). The first two denials involved water-carrier protests; in the third the railroads
were endeavoring to forestall construction of a pipe line. Shipper requests for such rates
were denied in Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & S.R.R., 243 I.C.C. 5S9 (1941 .
Consideration was given in these cases to costs and other relevant factors.
52. Rugs and Matting from East to Western T.L Territory, 31 M.C.C. 193 (1941).
35 M.C.C. 641 (1942), rced sab nom. Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. Unite4
States, 321 U.S. 194 (1944) ; Rugs and Matting, etc., 43 M.C.C. 540 (1944) (rec-nisiderathu;
of prior decision).
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"Also," Dr. Huntington notes, "freight forwarders and motor carriers
were not allowed to charge joint rates . . .nor were motor carriers allowed
to charge proportional rates (lower rates on through traffic) on freight for-
warder traffic."'5 3 Various interests tried to have the Motor Carrier Act so
construed as to give forwarders a common-carrier status, without which they
could not lawfully have joint rates with motor carriers or use proportional
rates.14 Arguments supporting this construction were far-fetched on their
face and inconsistent with the legislative history and commonly accepted rules
of statutory construction; the Commission thus rejected these arguments."
Both Congress and the Commission labored at great length to determine the
appropriate relationship of forwarders to other transportation agencies. Sub-
sequently, Congress authorized joint rates, which actually were in effect from
1942 to September 20, 1951. Later, it gave forwarders common-carrier status
and specified the conditions under which they could use motor common-carrier
service.5 6 In fact, the Commission, at congressional request, permitted motor
carriers to depart from the law as construed by the Commission and the
courts, while awaiting final clarification of the issues by legislation. 1
As indicated earlier, Dr. Huntington has confined his detailed treatment
of rate decisions to a fairly early period in the regulation of motor carriers.
Documentation of his statement that after World War II railroads again
"received the favor and indulgence of the ICC" consists largely of obscure
references to a weekly publication of American Trucking Associations, Inc.,"
and to a hearing which developed nothing in point. In any event, it should
come as no surprise that the Commission, mindful of the requirements of
Section 15a and of the rights conferred on carriers by other sections of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 9 permitted railroads to make post-war cuts in
particular rates after the general rate level had been pushed tip by increased
costs. The Commission also is mindful of the corresponding rules of rate
making in other parts of the Act and of all provisions of the Act which bear
on the lawfulness of rates. It does not knowingly permit noncompensatory
rates in any field of transportation.
Administration of motor carrier regulation. The author states that the
reshaping of the administration of motor carrier regulation along functional
53. Huntington, p. 497.
54. Freight forwarders always had been treated by railroads as shippers.
55. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 17 M.C.C. 549 (1939).
56. The freight-forwarder part of the Act (IV) was added in 1942, but forwarders did
not obtained common-carrier status until December 20, 1950. 64 STAT. 1113 (1950).
57. See 55 ICC ANIt. REP. 32 (1941).
58. Transport Topics. No page references are given to this publication, issues of which
range from sixteen to sixty or more pages. The author's general failure to indicate the pages
in a decision relied on to support his interpretation of a specific point often throws an un-
justified burden on the reader.
59. See p. 176 supra.
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lines constituted in effect a reneging on a promise given the industry as a
condition precedent to its acceptance of regulation. In the formative stages
of this regulation, the work was handled by a division (of Commissioners)
with duties, as members of that division, which related solely to motor
carrier matters, but with opportunity for appeal to the entire Commission,
and there was (and is) a separate bureau devoted to administrative work
in the field. It presumably is thought that a separate division and bureau
would understand motor carrier problems better and give them more sympa-
thetic consideration than would divisions or bureaus concerned with several
modes of transportationO
The changes referred to were made in part in 1939. Section 17(2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act was amended in September, 1940, to read, in part,
as follows:
"The assignment or reference, to divisions, of work, business, or
functions relating to the lawfulness of rates, fares, or charges shall
be made according to the character of regulation to be exercised and
not according to the kind or class of the carriers involved or to the
form or mode of transportation in which such carriers may be
engaged." 61
This legislation was an outcome of the very competition which the author's
own citations reveal so fully. Because both rail and motor rates must be
considered in a large proportion of rate cases, continued use of two separate
divisions to hear rate proceedings would have been undesirable. The steps
taken under the 1940 legislation assure motor carriers of all previous rights
and of equal opportunity with the railroads to secure adequate consideration
of their claims. If the author urges that the mental processes of some of the
Commissioners preclude fair treatment for motor carriers, he is making a
serious charge of inability to base decisions on the evidence. Actually, most
examiners who prepare proposed reports or review reports in motor carrier
rate cases are on the staff of the Bureau of Motor Carriers, but this fact
should be given little weight. All staff members are career employees, many
with experience in more than one branch of the Commission's work. None
has any reason to depart from the evidence or evaluate it so as to favor a
particular form of transportation. If he did, his efforts would not survive the
review process. And the "emasculation" of the Bureau of Motor Carriers was
60. It is worth noting that the motor carrier division rendered many of the rate decisions
the author considers to have been unfairly disadvantageous to motor carriers.
61. 54 STAT. 914 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17(2) (1946). Commissioner Eastman, Chairman
of the Commission's Legislative Committee, indicated his individual approval of a functional
division of the Commission's work but stated that the Commission had not reached a con-
clusion on the matter. Hearings before House Commfittee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on HR. 25M, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1939). He stated shortly thereafter that the
Commission was opposed to a similar but somewhat broader provision and said it should be
free to adjust its internal organization. Hearings before Senate Committee on Intcrtate
Commerce on Transportation Act of 1939, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 774-S (1939).
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brought about primarily to obtain coordinated and therefore more efficient
handling of the kinds of problem (such as accounting or tariffs) susceptible
of similar treatment in the various fields of transportation. Consolidation of
staff work along functional lines should not and undoubtedly has not affected
the interests of a particular group of carriers.0 2 Moreover, the bureau still
has important functions.
Operating rights. The Commission is charged with having "narrowly in-
terpreted the 'grandfather clause' (statutory authorization of operating rights
to carriers for bona fide operations on a given date) so as to deny certificates
and permits to many operating truck lines"; or it "has frequently severely
restricted them as to the territory or classes of shippers which might be
served or the commodities which might be transported."0 3 An informal type
of procedure was used so far as possible in order to expedite handling of
some 84,000 applications. Other carriers' present and future operations were
at stake. Hence, the Commission felt it had to insist on adequate proof of
bona fide operation on the grandfather date and to adopt literal and specific
standards rather than standards which would leave open ends. Carriers
quickly became aware of the value of these "rights" and many claimed
all they thought they could possibly get, although they may not have possessed
facilities to handle the traffic so claimed. In trying to he'w to the line, the
Commission actually was benefiting the motor carrier industry in given areas
and in the country as a whole. Even so, the Commission probably was more
generous, by and large, than the law required it to be. A few appeals were
won in court, and some resulted in greater liberality in subsequent decisions.
The Commission frequently has given carriers certificates on a showing of
public convenience and necessity for operations which they could not prove
on the "grandfather" basis and also rights which have enabled more efficient
operations.0 4 Furthermore, it should be noted that railroad opposition to
the granting of "grandfather" applications was a minor fact compared to the
opposition of competing motor carriers. In fact, railroads and members of
Congress claim that the Commission has been unduly liberal in granting
rights and has not sufficiently considered the availability of rail service.05
62. For one thing, when such consolidations occur, the separate motor carrier entities
have been preserved, as in the Bureau of Traffic, where the section of motor tariffs is headed
by an assistant director who formerly was chief of the same section in the Bureau of Motor
Carriers. The present director of the Bureau of Accounts and Cost Finding formerly was the
chief of the section of accounts of the Bureau of Motor Carriers.
63. Huntington, p. 498.
64. As where "grandfather" rights covered only one-way hauls.
Two of the cases cited in Huntington, p. 498 n.139, are completely misconstrued, tile
third involved a question as to continuity of operations and application of the bankruptcy
laws.
65. See, e.g., statement of Senator Edwin C. Johnson in Hearings before Senate Com.
inittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the Nominations of Hugh W. Cross, Richard
F. Mitchell, James K. Knudson, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 14-15 (1950).
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Many thousands of motor carrier applications have been granted where there
was rail service; denials because of such service have been extremely few in
proportion. The Commission believes it has given appropriate consideration
to the legitimate railroad protests. Accordingly, on the basis of complaints
by railroads and certain shippers, a bill (S. 2351) was introduced in the
82d Congress to require that "due consideration" be given "to such adverse
effect upon and the adequacy of all other types of transportation already
providing similar service ... " The Commission's Legislative Committee
did not give the bill its support.'-
Railroad penetration of motor transport field. We are told that the Com-
mission "for almost a decade" granted railroads operating rights and authority
to acquire existing motor carriers in such a wray as to "raise general fears in the
motor carriers as to the extent to which the Commission really wished to
preserve the independent trucker."
67
The record shows that, with very minor exceptions (as to which protests
were rare), all grants of new authority for property operations have been
limited to operations "auxiliary to and supplemental of" rail operations. These
limitations have been termed "coordinating conditions." The Commission
permitted railroads to continue a service they had been rendering, in some
instances for over a century, but with the assistance of a new instrument-
the truck. This policy is continuing. The record also shows that for a period
there was a divergence in the extent and manner of applying the "coordinat-
ing conditions" to acquisitions of existing carriersGS The Commission has
succeeded, however, in generally eliminating this divergence, but only over
very strong opposition of the affected railroads60 At the present time most
rail-motor service is subject to the requirement of a prior or subsequent rail
haul or limited by a so-called key-point restriction, which prohibits service
between any two key points or through more than one. As a result, railroads
can conduct "all-motor" service to a very limited extent except where a rail-
road or its subsidiary had "grandfather" rights in such service. Accordingly,
the Commission continues to be criticized by the railroads for its allegedly
narrow interpretation of the intent of the law.70
66. Hearings before Senate Comnittee on Interstate and Foreign Conmerce on Bills
Relative to Domestic Land and Water Transportation, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 223-4 (1952).
67. Huntington, pp. 493-9.
68. Rock Island Motor Trans. Co.-Purchase---White Line Motor Freight, 40 M.C.C.
457, 461-74 (1946).
69. See United States v. Rock Island Motor Trans. Co., 340 U.S. 419 (1951) ; United
States v. Texas & Pac. Motor Trans. Co., 340 U.S. 450 (1951). The legislative standards
are given in § 5(2) (b) of the Act.
70. See, e.g., testimony of NV. L Grubbs in Hearings before Senate Committee o; In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce on Domestic Land and Wfater Transportation Parsnant to
S. Res. 50, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 250-2 (1950), stating that Commission restrictions "have
served to hamper the railroads from making full and economical use of motor vehicles in
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Whether motor carrier fears of engulfment by rail-conducted motor opera-
tions had any basis can be answered in part by certain statistics. In a test week
in 1944, operations conducted directly by class I railroads, or for them by
controlled or other motor carriers, accounted for 3.9 percent of the vehicle-
miles of all class I intercity motor carriers of property,7" and for a smaller
percentage of course, of the miles of all ICC carriers. Operations of such small
proportions, most of them tied in rigidly with rail service, scarcely constitute
a threat to the maintenance of independent trucking.
Space limitations forbid discussion of the passenger cases cited by the author
beyond stating that independent bus lines usually have not sought the imposi-
tion of "coordinating conditions," which as a rule would not be practicable,
and that in permitting acquisitions the Commission considers patrons' interests
and the need for preservation of essential competition.
72
Long-haul trucking. "Only recently the Commission announced a policy
which would seem to indicate that motor carriers are to be barred from operat-
ing upon a transcontinental scale." 78 Reference is to Pacific Interncounlain
Exp. Co.-Control and Purchase.7 4 That decision and its supplement"
involved the denial of a trucker's application to purchase an eastern carrier to
enable provision of a new, one-carrier, coast-to-coast service. Actually, no
new policy was adopted. The Commission had to consider whether there was
need for the service in the public interest 76 and found that the public interest
embraces the interest of competing carriers and of shippers. Other motor
carriers would have been injured by changes in interline relationships; railroads
and shippers of grains and other commodities were concerned over the effects
connection with, or in substitution for, its [.ic] rail operation," and recommending legis-
lation.
A full explanation of ICC policy is found in Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Com.
Carrier Application, 10 M.C.C. 221 (1938), 28 M.C.C. 5 (1941), one of several leading
decisions cited but not explored by Dr. Huntington. This decision discusses, inter alia, the
motor carriers' contention that they should be allowed to perform auxiliary or supplemental
service in conjunction with railroads. The Commission did not accept the carriers' conten-
tion, and the Commission was upheld on this point in ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 (1945).
Independent motor carriers, however, furnish much of this service under contract.
71. ICC, BUREAU OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, MOTOR OPERATIONS Dy
OR FOR CLASS I RAILROADS, 1944, STATMENT No. 4829, pp. 39-40 (1948). If independent
(not-for-rail) operations of rail-controlled motor carriers had been included, the percentage
would have been higher, but not appreciably so. The percentage for passenger operations was
higher, but the issue has not been raised as to such operations.
72. A discussion of developments in the rail-motor field is found in 62 ICC ANN. RrA,,
54-9 (1948). It may be noted that Burlington and Santa Fe subsidiaries and more recently
the Union Pacific and Chicago & North Western have sold their interests in large motor-
bus operations to independent carriers.
73. Huntington, p. 499.
74. 57 M.C.C. 341 (1950).
75. Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co.--Control and Purchase, 57 M.C.C. 467 (1951).
76. See N.Y. Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-5 (1932).
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of possible additional diversion of traffic from rail service. Moreover, existing
rail and motor facilities were found to be meeting all requirements. Commis-
sioner Knudson, concurring, pointed out, among other things, that applicant
was specializing on high-grade traffic mainly between large cities; in contrast
to the railroads, applicant did not bear the burden of serving less profitable
traffic and smaller places. Refusal to grant the application did not debar trans-
continental service, which was-and still is--conducted through trailer inter-
changes. In sum, the Commission has no set formula for judging applications
which involve a large territorial reach. Some are granted and some denied 7
Rail-Water Competition
Prior to mid-Twenties. Prior to the mid-Twenties the Commission "had ade-
quately balanced the interests" of rail and water carriers, Dr. Huntington says;
he complains only about the administration of a phase of the Panama Canal
Act of 1912.78 He misunderstands, however, the reasons for the Panama
Canal Act decisions which he cites.7 Also, important factors favoring the
water carriers are overlooked. The statute virtually bars railroads from enter-
ing into water transportation (aside from ancillary harbor operations), and
Commission decisions under other provisions of the Panama Canal Act granted
benefits to water transportationsO Another fact is most significant: the Com-
mission placed rail rates in various areas on a "dry-land" basis after the decline
in water transportation. The resulting removal of low, water-compelled rail
rates created conditions essential to the rejuvenation of important branches
of water transportation after World War 1.81
77. Specialized haulers generally have less difficulty in establishing that existing
service is not adequate.
78. Huntington, pp. 499-500.
79. The decisions rested in large part on public representations as to the need for con-
tinuing the service under railroad auspices. On the other hand, the Commission required a
substantial number of divorcements. The most far-reaching one, in Lake Line Applications
under Panama Canal Act, 33 I.C.C. 699 (1915), cited as if it accepted the railroad position,
had unfortunate effects, in the eyes of some. on "package" freight service in that area. For
details of administration of the act and some discussion of the effects of the decisions, see
SENx. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., App. I (1934) ; ICC, Burtmu or Tm%-.sFro.rr Eco-
NOMICS AND STATisTics, HisTozIca.L DEELOPMENT or TRA sprour Cco. mATw:- AwD
INTGRATION I THE UNITED STATEs, STA.rmFr No. 5015, c. IV (950). See aso Sugar
Cases of 1922, 81 I.C.C. 448, 467 (1923). The number of rail-cuntrolled line-haul xater
operations now remaining is very small.
80. See Wharfage Facilities at Pensacola, Fla., 27 I.C.C. 252 (1913) ; Baltimore &
C.S.S. Co. v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 49 I.C.C 176 (1918); Colonial Navigation Co. Y. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 50 I.C.C. 625 (1918) ; State of New York v. New York Cent R.R.,
95 I.C.C. 119 (1924). See decree enjoining enforcement of order, New Yor: Cent. ILR. v.
United States, 19 F.2d 200 (N.D.N.Y. 1925), re'd, 272 U.S. 457 (1926).
81. See testimony of Commisioner Charles D. Mahaffie in Hearings before Sub-Com-
mnttee of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Transportation Prob-
lems, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-4 (1950).
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Mid-Twenties to 1940. "Beginning in this period,.., the railroads instituted
a concerted competitive drive against the water carriers. In this they had the
virtually complete cooperation of the I CC."'82 Before going further, it should
be noted that the railroads were on sound legal ground in reducing rates so
long as the resulting charges met the tests mentioned earlier ;83 that this period
of rising inland water competition appeared to the railroads to call for im-
mediate efforts to protect their traffic; that severe financial emergency in the
Thirties required maximum possible conservation of revenues, even if reduced
rates were involved; and that port-to-port rates were unregulated,8 4 with
resulting inadequate knowledge by railroads and the Commission of rates, costs,
and other pertinent phases of the competition.8 5 Moreover, free use of improved
waterways has long aggrieved railroads and undoubtedly has figured in their
attitude toward water transportation. Their effort to secure consideration of
this subject in Rail and Barge Joint Rates 80 was unsuccessful. When the Com-
mission was given control of port-to-port rates in 1940, many for-hire opera-
tions were exempted.
8 7
During federal operation of the railroads, a twenty percent differential was
set, representing the extent to which rail-water rates were lower than all-rail
rates. The first specific charge is in substance that in some instances reduction
of this differential to fifteen or ten percent showed hostility to water transporta-
tion. But the reasons for reduction yield a different conclusion, The Denison
Act 88 gave common carriers on designated waterways the right to obtain
certificates of public convenience and necessity for the mere asking; it also
required the Commission to direct all connecting railroads-and their connec-
tions in turn-to join with water carriers in through routes and joint rates to
the extent necessary or desirable in the public interest. The Commission also
was to fix reasonable minimum differentials between rail-water and all-rail
rates. Over strong railroad protests and unsuccessful'court action, the Com-
mission construed this act literally and to the advantage of the water carriers.80
However, in the first case cited by the author, Through Routes and Joint
Rates90 the Inland Waterways Corporation sought application of the twenty
percent differential to traffic which in some instances would move over very
82. Huntington, pp. 499-500.
83. See p. 178 supra.
84. With exceptions no longer important or pertinent here.
85. See Sugar Cases of 1933, 195 I.C.C. 127, 131-2 (1933).
86. 270 I.C.C. 591 (1948).
87. See note 201 infra.
88. Section 2(e), 45 STAT. 978 (1928) ; repealed as of October 1, 1940.
89. Procedure under Barge Line Act, 148 I.C.C. 129 (1928). In United States v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934), the Supreme Court reversed the Conimission and
required it to allow railroads to ask for and obtain suspension, pending an investigation, of
any joint barge-rail rates the Commission might order. See Hosmer, The Denison Act:
An Experinent in Administrative Law, 10 ICC PRAcr. J. 1007-35 (1943).
90. 153 I.C.C. 129 (1929).
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circuitous routes compared with direct all-rail routes, and to some traffic on
which barge haul would be so short, compared to the rail, as to create the
possibility that the barge-rail cost might exceed the all-rail cost.91 In the interest
of reasonable economy the Commission prescribed a lower differential where
these conditions would exist. It also sought to avoid sharp differences in rates
at border points. The Commission then directed all railroads to participate with
barge lines and other water carriers in through routes and joint rates on the
basis of a twenty or a ten percent differential. This sweeping order was based
on the economics of the situation and reflected a sincere effort to implement the
public interest under legislation especially enacted to favor water transportation.
It is, therefore, far from the fact that the Commission acquiesced in the rail-
roads' "persistent refusal" to enter into joint rates and through routes with
the water carriers "despite congressional pressure to the contrary."02 The in-
creasing use of the Denison Act ended when the Supreme Court subjected it
to an impracticable construction.93
The notion that water carriers participating in rail-water rates were made
to bear the full burden of the differential also is in error. Barring conditions
not here pertinent, barge lines generally have conceded that railroads are
entitled to a division equal to the amount they receive to or from the same
interchange point on all-rail traffic.94 Water carriers cuuld not logically expect
the railroads to be interested in promoting water transportation by taking less
revenue than they would receive from the all-rail rates to which the barge-rail
rates were differentially related.
"[T]he Commission began to permit railroads to charge discriminatory rates
on traffic which had a prior or subsequent haul by water."03 The first case
cited 9' is not in point. Nor is the second,07 as the proposed rail rates were
condemned specifically to protect water competition and the shippers' advant-
age in location on navigable waters. In this case the Commission cited the
author's third case,98 for support. In the last cited case, rail proposals to
eliminate water carriers from application of the proportional rates similarly
were found unlawful.99 On this subject, therefore, the author misunderstands
his own citations; this defect is not uncommon in the article.
91. See Inland Waterways Corp. v. Alabama G.S.R.R., 151 I.C.C. 126, 144 (1929).
The Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. itself proposed a lower differential than twenty
percent. Application of Mississippi Valley B.L. Co., 167 I.C.C. 41, 45 (1930). There -was,
in fact, nothing magical or very authoritative about the twenty percent differential. Its
origin is obscure; some have traced it back to German practices.
92. Huntington, p. 500.
93. See note 89 supra.
94. See Rail and Barge Joint Rates, 270 I.C.C. 591, 612-13 (1943).
95. Huntington, p. 500.
96. Ex-River Grain from St. Louis to the South, 203 I.C.C. 335, 391 (1934).
97. Raw Sugar, New Orleans to Grammercy and Reserve, La., 206 I.C.C. 231 (1935).
98. Chattanooga Packet Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 33 I.C.C. 3S4 (1915).
99. Restriction of Proportional Rates, 161 I.C.C. 113 (1930).
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Evaluation of the statement that the Commission was "liberal" in per-
mitting railroads to depart from the long-and-short-haul provision of the
Act involves technical matters which cannot be discussed here. But it should
be noted that while Section 500 of the Transportation Act of 1920 called for
preservation of both rail and water transportation "in full vigor," the Com-
mission did not have jurisdiction then over port-to-port rates and had no
way of securing information as to water transport costs. On the other hand,
it was given definite responsibilities for a railroad industry which after the
mid-Twenties was suffering severe competitive losses and later was in poor
financial condition. 100 Its decisions reflected the statutory standards and the
conditions of individual cases. The further charge that the Commission co-
operated with the railroads to evade Section 4(2) of the Act is answered
completely in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States.1
01
It is true that in various revenue proceedings, in which a general per-
centage increase in rail rates has been authorized, the Commission has per-
mitted railroads to effect lesser or no increases in those rates applying to
certain water-competitive traffic. No carrier, rail or water, can be compelled
to charge rates which would drive traffic to a competitor if the traffic could
be retained by lower rates. Such rates, however, must meet all tests of
lawfulness. The same comment applies to the remark that the Commission
has shown "a marked tendency to permit the railroads to lower rates on
highly competitive items, at times such reductions going below the fully
compensatory level." The rule consistently followed is that water-competi-
tive rates must be no lower than necessary to meet the competition and high
enough to cover out-of-pocket costs and make at least some contribution to
fixed costs in those types of cases where rates do not cover fully-distributed
costs.
1940 to date. The author states that in applying the Water Carrier Act
of 1940, the Commission "has continued most of the policies which alienated
the barge lines in the 1930's. The Commission is still reluctant to require
railroads to enter into though routes and joint rates with the water lines," 02
100. The author's idea that there was something nefarious about granting so-called
"flexible" relief, when the alternative would have been delay and harrassment in meeting
water competition, is far-fetphed. In the infrequent cases in which "flexible" relief was per-
mitted, definite limits were set below which the railroads were not permitted to go. One effect
was to require the railroads to increase their rates should the water carriers see fit to in-
crease theirs. See Pacific Coast Fourth Section Applications, 165 I.C.C. 373, 404 (1930);
Sugar from California to Chicago, 211 I.C.C. 239, 254 (1935).
101. 249 U.S. 557, 568-9 (1919).
102. Huntington, p. 502. The author also alludes here to the lack of an adequate ad-
ministrative bureau for water carrier regulation. Much of the work is assigned to other
bureaus. The Bureau of Water Carriers and Freight Forwarders should have a larger staff,
however, to do the work assigned to it. Adequate funds would solve this problem. See
65 ICC AxN. RF.. 126, 143 (1951).
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The evidence offered is very sketchy: a general statement by a waterways
association and one decision.
103
Dr. Huntington complains about the long delay in deciding Rail and Barge
Rates;1° this delay resulted mainly from reopening the record for admission
of new evidence and from the complex nature of the cost and other exhibits.
As joint rates were in effect while the case was pending, it does not appear
that the delay was unduly "burdensome." Contrary to the author's statement,
the Commission's final decision gave the water carriers approximately what
they had asked for.0 5 This treatment was accorded despite evidence which
showed that barge-rail costs exceeded all-rail costs and that costs provided
no basis for differentials. The Conmision grounded its decision, not on
costs, but on the lower quality of barge-line service and the declared policy
of Congress to promote water transportation on the MIississippi River and
its tributaries, particularly as this policy related to the Inland Waterways
Corporation. 06 The great increase in terminal handling costs and other
costs, coupled with service disabilities, has caused common carrier barge
lines largely to eschew L.C.L. business, and some have abandoned port-to-
port and rail-barge carload traffic." ' Thus, aside frum the largely unavoidable
delay, it is difficult to see wherein the water lines have reasonable cause for
complaint over the decision.
Next referred to are the so-called Meching decisions, eventually reversed
by the Supreme Court for having held that rail proportional rates applicable
on grain and grain products from Chicago to eastern points could not be
used in connection with ex-barge grain."' - The Commission's position arose
out of differences in conditions in all-rail and barge-rail movements, including
the absence of Commission control over the inbound barge rates. "Despite
this action," the author adds, "the Commission has allowed the railroads to
maintain similar discriminatory rates on a large volume of traffic, this neces-
sitating further legal action on the part of water carriers."'15 The one case
cited as proof is still under consideration. 110 The allegation of "continued
103. Inland Nav. Co. v. Big Creek & T.R.R., 281 I.C.C. 515 (1951). Only two com-
modities were involved. As to petroleum, the Commission found that the proposed rail-
barge route would tend to destroy an edsting truck-barge movement, which in many. ways
was more economical than rail-barge. The rail-barge movement would have involved an
expensive transfer of grain through an elevator. This transfer, with other factors, would
have rendered the service uneconomical.
104. 270 I.C.C. 591 (1943). See also 65 ICC Axx. . REP. 54-5 (1951).
105. See Alabama G.S.R.R. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 224 (1951).
105. Rail and Barge Joint Rates, 270 I.C.C. 591, 609-13 (1948).
107. See, e.g., New Orleans Traf. & Transp. Bureau v. Miss. Valley Barge, 2S0 I.C.C.
105, 107-8 (1951).
10M Huntington, p. 503 and n.165.
109. Huntington, p. 503.
110. American Barge Line Co. v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., Docket No. 30744. And see
Alabama G.S.R.R. v. American Barge Line Co., Docket No. 30787, also now under con-
sideration.
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liberality" in granting fourth-section relief, discussed above,"' has no adequate
factual support in the general remarks found in the cited sources. And the
author has ignored decisions which denied railroad applications to reduce
water-competitive rates" 2 and decisions which permited reductions in water
rates over railroad protests.113 Adequate documentation in the later period
again is lacking.
Something also is said about the effects of the Commission's "railroad
partiality" on coastwise and intercoastal carriers. There is no mention of the
one fact which dominates the whole postwar rail-water scene in this area:
increased labor and other costs of water carriers-especially for classes of
traffic which require a large amount of shore labor and expensive accessorial
services."14 The interruption of services during the war was an adverse
factor, as the author states, but he does not mention postwar interruptions
resulting from many labor-management differences,'" shifts in areas of pro-
duction and consumption, or the mounting difficulties of these carriers before
Commission regulation began. The purport of his remarks is that the Com-
mission should raise rail rates to enable water carriers to become as active
as they were before the war. The law does not permit the Commission to
deprive railroads or other carriers of the right to compete within lawful
limits. Moreover, the increases in rail rates sought by water carriers would
impair the position of shippers competing with shippers (such as those at in-
terior points) whose rates would not be increased correspondingly. The possi-
bility of removal of plants to avoid payment of high rates and diversion of traffic
to trucks were other necessary considerations.
The conclusion that the "net result of these [five major ICC postwar] in-
vestigations [of rail and water rates] has been virtually inconsequential"
is true only if it is thought that the investigations should have restored coast-
wise and intercoastal shipping to complete health. In the light, however, of
the legal and economic factors stated above, the Commission's actual accom-
plishments under a statute whose basic concept is one of competition have
111. Seep. 192 s pra.
112. The examples which follow include decisions reached after completion of Dr.
Huntington's article, but others could have been found without difficulty. Divisions of
Freight Rates, 156 I.C.C. 94, 96 (1929) ; Application of American Barge Line Co., 200
I.C.C. 717 (1934); Wood Pulp, Houston, Tex., to Cincinnati and Hamilton, Ohio, 280
I.C.C. 388 (1951) ; Cigars from Tampa, Fla., to New York, N.Y., 283 I.C.C. 787 (1951);
Ground Barite, Arkansas, Missouri, Georgia to Louisiana, 283 I.C.C. 665 (1951); Sugar
Cases of 1951, 284 I.C.C. 333 (1952) ; Sulphur, Port Sulphur, La., and Texas to Hamilton,
Ohio, 284 I.C.C. 275 (1952) ; Sulphur from Louisiana and Texas to Nashville and Old
Hickory, 283 I.C.C. 628 (1952).
113. E.g., Sulphate of Alumina, New Orleans and Mobile to Houston, 284 I.C.C. 417
(1952). See also Commission's statement in Cotton from Memphis and Helena to New
Orleans, 273 I.C.C. 337, 365 (1948).
114. See All Rail Commodity Rates between California, Oregon, and Washington, 277
I.C.C. 511, 554-63 (1950).
115. See, e.g., Pacific Shipper, May 5, 1952, p. 20.
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been substantial. 116 The Pacific coastwise water carriers did not immediately
take advantage of the opportunity to petition for removal of the rail fourth-
section orders which they considered disadvantageous to their recovery, but
once this petition was filed, the Commission acted promptly. Numerous show-
cause orders were issued against the railroads. The Commission called atten-
tion to steps water carriers could take under its outstanding orders, and they
took these steps, with good results." 7 ICC removed all fourth-section relief
from railroad rates on the Pacific coast "8 and required other adjustments
involving rates between interior points and the ports-all with advantage to
the water carriers. Substantial increases in rail rates resulted, apart from the
general increases.1" 9 When, however, water carrier terminal costs alone ex-
ceeded the total rail costs between the same ports,' -° the Commission could
not relieve the serious economic disability of the carriers.12 ' It could act only
where other factors indicated that such rail rates could be increased. More-
over, it had to consider the possibility that upgrading of water-competitive
rail rates might injure shippers and entire trading areas. 1 Where their
interests and conditions permitted, Nwater carriers have benefited greatly by
advancing their rates with general increases in rail rates. A condition of rising
costs before the war '2 has become more serious in the postwar period for cer-
tain types of water carriers.12 4 The Commission, however, is not responsible for
the basic condition of water transportation and cannot do the impossible to
overcome this condition.
2 5
116. The Commission's concern over the problems of water carriers is shown by a
series of chapters on "Water-Competitive Rail Rates" in its more recent annual reports.
These chapters provide a summary of what the Commission did. Its recent decision in Class
Rates Investigation, 1939, 286 I.C.C. 5 (1952), in which, over very strong railroad objec-
tion, it required the continuance of ocean-rail class rates on the previously established dif-
ferential basis, should not go unnoticed here.
117. See 64 ICC ANN. REP. 52 (1950).
118. As a result of the decision in All-Rail Commodity Rates betveen California,
Oregon, and Washington, 268 I.C.C. 515 (1947), 277 I.C.C. 511 (1950).
119. See All-Rail case, supra note 118, 277 I.C.C. 513, 517-18.
120. See id. at 560, 567.
121. In id. at 567, the Commission stated: "On the whole record we find that a level of
rail rates between the ports, which would be high enough to permit the water lines to estab-
lish port-to-port rates on a basis differentially lower but still yielding sufficient revenues
to cover costs of the service and return some profit, would be substantially higher than any
reasonable minimum level which we could require."
122. Shippers and the Department of Agriculture were prepared to offer determined
opposition to increases in rail rates for the benefit of water lines in the three discontinued
proceedings cited in Huntington, p. 483 n.172. See also Increased Freight Rates, 1947, 270
LC.C. 403, 444-5 (1948).
123. See 60 ICC ANN. REP. 32 (1946) ; testimony of Vn. Radner, Hearings bcforc
Senate Comnmittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Merchant Marine Study and
Investigation, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1141 (1949).
124. See 65 ICC ANN. REP. 11-14 (1951).
125. An effort to analyze the postwar problems of water carriers and to understand
their needs was made in IMoRaAN, PRoBL.EMS IN THE REGULATION or Doismc TRA1.sro.r,-
noN By WATER (Ex parte No. 165) (1946).
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The charge that the Commission's interpretation of the certificate pro-
visions "has also hamstrung the water carriers in a number of ways" pre-
sumably refers to the "grandfather" certificates. As in the case of motor
carriers, the Commission believed that a more or less literal construction of
the statute was required. Judging by the efforts of competing water carriers
to secure restriction of these grants, there must be considerable satisfaction
in the water carrier industry with what was done. The Commission has per-
mitted additional operations by "grandfather" carriers on a showing of
public convenience and necessity and thus has enabled better operating set-
ups.126 It has been charged, in fact, with being unduly liberal in granting
operating rights. 27
Monopoly and Antitrust
The author's position on this subject is as follows: The Commission's vig-
orously critical attitude toward monopoly before 1920, "while dependent upon
public and shipper support," gave way after the 1920 legislation to interpreta-
tions "colored by its dependence upon railroad support."'128 It has facilitated
the reduction of competition among railroads and aided their development of
cooperative devices designed to increase group solidarity. It generally has
failed to cooperate with the Department of Justice. For the most part, it has
gone along with the wishes of "the railroads in Section 5 cases (consolidations,
mergers, etc.).
A partial recital of the record since 1920, however, clearly shows no
change in the Commission's critical attitude toward undesirable railroad
practices: '(1) The pre-1920 investigations and the more adequate control
over financial practices provided in 1920 have discouraged practices which
had been sources of complaint. (2) The proceedings in valuation and re-
capture cases showed no softness whatever toward railroad claims. 120 (3) Re-
organization proceedings have simplified and strengthened railroad capital
structures and reduced the confusing complexities of intercorporate rela-
tions. (4) Searching "financial" investigations have been made since 1920,180
(5) The Commission's field accountants scrutinize carrier records continu-
ously.13' (6) The Commission has cooperated with other agencies on impor-
126. E.g., Norfolk, Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc., Ext.-James R., 265 I.C.C. 313
(1948) ; Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp. Ext.-Baltimore, 265 I.C.C. 215 (1947) ; Weyerhauser
S.S. Co., Weyerhauser Line, Ext., 265 I.C.C. 211 (1947).
127. See Hearings, sutpra note 70, at 278, 1422.
128. Huntington, p. 488; see, generally, id. at pp. 488-92.
129. See New York Cent. R.R., 27 VAT. REP. 1 (1929) ; Excess Income of Richmond,
F. & P.R.R., 170 I.C.C. 451 (1931).
130. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. Investigation, 131 I.C.C. 615 (1928); New York, N.H.
& H.R.R. Investigations, 220 I.C.C. 505 (1937) ; and current investigation of Norfolk S. Ry.
and Norfolk S. Bus Corp., Docket No. 30980.
131. Funds for this type of work, and also for valuationwork, unfortunately have been
curtailed. See 65 ICC ANN. REP. 140, 142 (1951).
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taut investigations of mutual interest. 3 2 (7) Over objections in some quarters,
it required competitive bidding in the sale of certain securities 1' and, (8)
under specified conditions, requires the setting up of sinking funds for debt
retirement.2 4 (9) Proceedings on unification applications 135 showed the need
for bringing holding-company activities under more effective control; legisla-
tion to this end was sought 136 and procured.
The central theme of the indictment is, however, failure of the Commission
to follow the views of the Department of justice. The answer is simple: the
Commission has followed the statutes which govern its actions and thus has
endeavored to apply the will of Congress to particular situations.
The Commission, the author argues, "has in some instances positively
affected the conclusion of antitrust suits . . . [and] has in effect reversed
successful antitrust suits by approving under Section 5 . .. practices which
had previously been found to be in violation of those laws.'"13 Inasmuch as
Congress, after due deliberation, gave the Commission specific authority to
approve acquisitions of control found consistent with the public interest,
12
the argument has no basis whatever. Congress specifically provided for resort
to a "rule of reason" in the interpretation of the antitrust laws in this field.
The Commission has the responsibility of carrying out this policy, on the
basis of the facts in individual proceedings. The assumption that any action
it takes which lacks the approval of other agencies is in error is tantamount
to asking the Commission to disregard the law it is required to administer.239
132. E.g., with the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in its hold-
ing-company investigations, see H. REP. No. 2789, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) and with
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in its Investigation of Railroads Pursuant to
S. Res. 71. see Sn-r. R.EP. No. 714, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
133. In re Competitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 257 I.C.C. 129 (1944). For a fur-
ther tightening, see Atlantic C.L.R.R. Competitive Bidding Exemption, 232 I.C.C. 513
(1952).
134. See 56 ICC A.NN . REP. 26-9 (1942).
135. See Control of Erie R.R. and Pere Marquette Ry., 138 I.C.C. 517 (192a), 150
I.C.C. 751 (1929). In the first decision, the Commission said: "Financial manipulation of
great railroad properties as an accompaniment of acquisition or consolidation under the law
should not be tolerated." 138 I.C.C. at 533.
136. See 46 ICC AxN. REP. 23-5 (1932). See also New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Investi-
gation, 220 I.C.C. 505, 612-16 (1937).
137. Huntington, p. 489.
138. Reference is to the passage of § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1920
and of similar legislation applicable to motor carriers, in 1935. In 1940, § 5 was modified
to bring motor and water carriers under its terms.
139. This subject was studied by a House subcommittee, which summarized replies
from varied sources as follows: "Exemption of common carriers from the application of
the anti-trust statutes where the activitics in question are under the super.ision of the regu-
latory agency. Sentiment, particularly as expressed by users of transportation, is over-
whelmingly in favor of such an exemption." H. REP. No. 2735, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
ix (1946).
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The Commission is said to have helped to conceal, and possibly to have spon-
sored, the Western Commissioner Agreement of 1932. Contrary to the
author's statement, the Agreement was not confined to rate matters; reduc-
tions of competitive wastes figured prominently. In attempting to ameliorate
the effects of severe railroad depression, the Agreement was akin to the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 and NIRA code legislation.
In Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931,140 the Commission had urged the railroads
to cooperate to reduce competitive wastes, in keeping with the spirit of the
Transportation Act of 1920. It is possible, though opinion is divided, that
the Agreement should have been filed. Its existence was, however, a matter
of common knowledge.1 41 Not much was accomplished. There was no de-
barment of individual action. Here, as elsewhere, the Sherman Act has been
a continuing deterrent to efficiency in transport operations.
142
The author fails to bring out all pertinent facts about the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act of 1948 covering carrier's rate-bureaus: (1) As he states, this act gave
the ICC, for the first time, a direct hand in the affairs of rate bureaus
which choose to make use of its provisions. The opportunity afforded for
continuing critical scrutiny of bureaus in the light of the legislative standards
substituted positive action for a "hands-off" policy. The Commission accord-
ingly has given close attention to the organizational structures and operations
of bureaus which have filed agreements. In most decisions to date it has
found it necessary to require changes, particularly to assure free exercise of
the right of independent action. As amended, the agreements were found
not to diminish essential competition. There is no evidence whatever of what
the author calls "a lenient policy." (2) The article does not consider the
demoralizing and wasteful effects of any substantial change in, or alternative
to, rate bureaus.143 Such bureaus, adapting their organizations and methods
to the conditions faced after two adverse decisions, 144 had been operating for
many years with established procedures and with opportunity for any inter-
ested party to intervene. An important bureau, investigated in 1923 at the
request of the Senate, was found to be functioning for the most part in a
desirable manner.145 No Senate action followed. No complaints filed in any
140. 178 I.C.C. 539, 585-6 (1931).
141. See, e.g., Railway Age, Dec. 3, 1932, p. 834, Apr. 22, 1933, p. 779; Traffic World,
Dec. 3, 1932, p. 1068. See also statement of Director Eastman in Hcarings before Seenate
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 942, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 831-2 (1943).
142. In World War I the railroads were crippled in their efforts to do the best possible
job with their resources by fear of prosecution under the Sherman Act. See HINES, WAR
HrsTORy oF AmERICAN RAILROADS 14-15, 17-18 (1928). In World War II the Act again
was an obstructive factor. See OFFIcE oF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION, CIVILIAN WAR TRANs-
PORTATIoN 122-3 (1948). See also 58 ICC ANN. REP. 29-31 (1944).
143. See Western Traffic Ass'n Agreement, 276 I.C.C. 183, 212-15 (1949).
144. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
145. See Trans-Continental Freight Bureau, 77 I.C.C. 252 (1923).
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court had been made by shippers. There were, however, features of bureau
practice which required clarification, as shown by the wording of Section 5a.
(3) Shippers almost unanimously desired legislation giving these bureaus a
defined status. Shipper organizations, the association of state commissioners,
motor carriers, and responsible public officials supported this legislation.140
Only with the broadest possible endorsement could it have been passed over
presidential veto. To imply that the Commission and the railroads alone
procured passage of this legislation is to ignore the evidence. And one may
ask in this connection if broad sponsorship of this type of legislation is not
indicative of the Commission's "viability." (4) If there were any merit in the
author's attack, it would be obliterated by the fact that motor and water
carriers and freight forwarders, which also have had their rate bureaus, also
are covered by the legislation and have filed agreements for approval.147
Criticisms of the Pullman 148 and Associated Transport 149 decisions reveal
little understanding of the issues. The first proceeding involved approval or
disapproval of a proposed pooling arrangement; no other plan was before the
Commission. Public advantage and the lack of undue restraint of competi-
tion were controlling. What, in the circumstances, would the author have had
the Commission do? In the Associated case, the essential fact was the ex-
istence of a plethora of competition. The effort to find a railroad interest in
the proceeding was patently unrealistic; moreover, the question of a railroad
interest became moot.
The statement that "[i]t is rare that applications to purchase, merge, or
lease railroad lines or to acquire ownership of such lines or to enter into
operating agreements with such lines are turned down by the Commission"'1' 9
ignores important facts and decisions. The Transportation Act of 1920
attached great importance to consolidation of railroads. From 1920 to 1940
the Commission acted under a wording of Section 5 which specified that, in
passing upon a unification application, it should consider the relation of the
proposal to the consolidation plan the Commission was to draw up. This
plan was to preserve competition to the extent possible and maintain exist-
ing routes and channels of trade. The Commission obeyed these require-
ments as best it could. It accordingly looked with disfavor on railroad steps
146. See Hearings before Senate Conmnittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 942, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), on H.R. 2536. 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946), on H.R. 221 ard
S. 110, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
147. joint action by different modes of transportation, such as railroads and motor
carriers, is barred by § 5a, except as to matters relating to transportation under joint rates
or over through routes.
The author's reference to the so-called "administrative battle" about rate bureaus
during the war is one of the subjects passed over here because of space limitations. See
note 5 supra.
148. Pooling of Railroad Earnings and Service, Pullman Co., 263 I.C.C. 473 (1947).
149. Associated Transport, Inc., Control and Consolidation, 38 M.C.C. 137 (1942),
150. Huntington, p. 491.
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inconsistent with the plan, invoked the antitrust laws, 1 1 and brought about
the trusteeing of the voting stock of certain railroads. 15 2 It investigated the
Van Sweringen empire, put together in this period by means beyond the
Commission's control and doomed soon to collapse.1 3 The Commission's
efforts to require the Pennsylvania to dispose of its holdings of Lehigh Valley
and Wabash stock were overturned in court on the ground that the acquisition
of this stock was for investment purposes. 54 Subsequently, in authorizing
the Pennsylvania to acquire control of the Wabash, the Commission required
the Pennsylvania to trustee the stock of the Lehigh Valley and the New
Haven. 1 No one familiar with these various stormy episodes would ques-
tion the toughness'of the Commission's efforts to maintain competition.
In 1940, after it became clear that the Commission's consolidation "plan"
would not be carried out by the railroads, the law was changed in this respect
to the present wording of Section 5. Since then there have been relatively
few consolidation proposals not involving changes in the relations of railroads
already parts of a given system. 1 6 One exception is the acquisition of the
Alton by the Gulf,. Mobile & Ohio, 5 7 but Commission approval of the crea-
tion of a new North-South system could scarcely be considered an infringe-
ment on competition. The Commission denied the Santa Fe's application to
acquire entrance into St. Louis from Kansas City,"" on the grounds that
ample competition existed and that diversions would have far-reaching effects.
ICC also allowed the Central of Georgia to obtain control of the Savannah
& Atlanta on a finding that the need for strengthening the Central of
Georgia (which had been turned loose by the Illinois Central) was a factor
more important than the loss of a relatively small amount of competition.169
In saying that "applications to permit interlocking directorates are almost
invariably approved," the author misses the essential point that most such
applications involve intrasystem officials. The Commission's extreme diligence
where possibility of reduced competition exists indicates its devotion to the
principle of maintaining competition in the public interest.100
151. ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 152 I.C.C. 721 (1929); ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 160 I.C.C. 785 (1930); ICC v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 I.C.C. 618 (1930); Nickel
Plate Unification, 105 I.C.C. 425 (1926); Unification of Southwestern Lines, 124 I.C.C,
401 (1927).
152. The two Baltimore and Ohio R.R. cases, sutpra note 151.
153. See p. 197 supra.
154. Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 651 (1934).
155. Wabash R.R. Control, 247 I.C.C. 365 (1941).
156. E.g., Pere Marquette Ry. Merger, 267 I.C.C. 207 (1947) (merger of the Pere
Marquette into the Chesapeake & Ohio), and numerous instances of changes to simplify
intercorporate structures in which there was little or no public interest, as shown by the
absence of protests. Minority stockholders objected in some instances.
157. Gulf, M. & Ohio, Purchase, Securities, 261 I.C.C. 405 (1945).
158. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Control, 271 I.C.C. 63 (1948).
159. Savannah & Atlanta Ry. Control, 282 I.C.C. 39 (1951).
160. See Directors of Wheeling & L;E., 138 I.C.C. 643 (1928); Application of Leonor
F. Loree, 145 I.C.C. 521 (1928) ; In re Rand, 175 I.C.C. 587 (1931) ; In re Astor, 193 I.C.C.
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The reader should consider the statement of national transportation policy,
particularly the provisions relative to the fostering of sound conditions in
transportation without unfair or destructive competitive practices, and also
the rate-making provisions of Sections 15a, 216(i), 307(f), and 406(d). He
then should ask himself whether the Commission would be discharging its
responsibilities if it attempted to be guided to a substantial extent by the
Sherman Act, passed at a time when railroads had the field of transporta-
tion substantially to themselves and regulation lacked effective force.""1 The
Commission endeavors to maintain competition in transportation, where
forces are at work which would suppress it contrary to the public interest,"*
but its more formidable task, particularly since 1935, has been to see that
competition does not get out of hand, to the injury of carriers, shippers, and
the public.
FAILURE TO COXSIDER EcoNoIc REALITIES
The Level of Rates and Fares
This subject is one of the "four major areas of Commission actiity"
which illustrates the author's view that "... in the rough world of competi-
tive politics nothing comes for free. Political support must be purchased, and
the price which the ICC has paid for its railroad support may be traced
throughout almost all important phases of its policy and behaior."'16
The "ease" with which railroads in recent years have obtained increased
charges is said to have been the subject of "considerable unfavorable com-
528 (1933); In re Smith, 252 I.C.C. 656 (1942); In re Coverdale, 252 I.C.C. 672 (1942);
In re Boatner, 257 I.C.C. 369 (1944); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Purchase, 271 I.C.C. 5
(1948). In the Astor case the railroads involved were the Delaware & Hudson, the Great
Northern, and the Illinois Central. Though these roads were physically far apart, the Com-
mission held that it had not been shown that public or private interests might not be affected
by an interlocding director.
161. See 58 ICC ANN. REP. 30-1 (1944). See also Associated Transport, Inc., Control
and Consolidation, 38 If.C.C. 137, 150 (1942) ; Western Traffic Association-Agreement,
276 I.C.C. 183, 211-12 (1949) (noting the statement of the Supreme Court that the Trans-
portation Act is not only a more recent but a more specific e-pression of policy as to antitrust
matters).
162. Rail lines are so rarely constructed at this time that we can better turn to motor
carrier cases for statements of Commission policy. Motor-bus transportation has attri-
butes which create a tendency, unless checked, toward a monopolistic structure of operations.
The Commission frequently has encouraged the maintenance of competitive services. See
Pan-American Bus Lines Operation, 1 M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936) ; Santa Fe Trail Stages,
Inc., Com. Carrier Application, 21 M.C.C. 725, 749-50 (1940) ; All-American Bus Lines
Com. Carrier Application, 18 M.C.C. 755, 786 (1939) ; Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.-Etenrion
of Operations-Boise-Salt Lake City, 44 M.C.C. 535, 543 (1945). The general situation in
motor property operations is one of an abundance of competition. In Balch & Martin Motor
Exp. Com. Carrier Application, 47 M.C.C. 75, 78 (1947), the Commission said: "we believe
that when the available traffic permits it, competition should be encouraged."
163. Huntington, p. 481; rates and fares are discussed id. at pp. 481-7.
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ment." It contrasts with the use of "rigorous criteria" from 1911 to 1918.
"In 1920, as its support from non-railroad sources was beginning to weaken,
the Commission approved a major increase. .. ." In 1922 it ordered a 10
percent reduction but "did not restore the prewar relationship between prices
and rates." From 1924 to 1929, rates were stabilized at about 165 percent
of the 1913 level, whereas prices had fallen back to about 149 percent. From 1924
through 1945, the Commission was able to maintain a rate level well above
the price level. When wholesale prices began to shoot upward in 1946, the
Commission "made valiant efforts to keep up with these skyrocketing prices."
In 1950, the rate index, according to the article, was 229.5 (1913 - 100)
and the price index was 231.4. "Considering the normal tendency of regu-
lated and administered prices to lag far behind violent fluctuations in the
general price level, the action of the Commission in moving rates up along
with prices is eloquent testimony to its sensitivity to railroad interests .... "104
Freight rates and price levels. The author's discussion is a bundle of errors
and inconsistencies. The importance he attaches to the relation between
rates and wholesale prices is shown by the reproduction (with extensions
from 1948 through 1950) of a chart introduced in a Commission proceeding.
The chart was taken from a sheet in Exhibit 54, Ex parte No. 168, Increased
Freight Rates, 1948,165 following sheet 3 of the exhibit in which the base
figures are given. These base figures are the annual revenues per ton and the
annual average length of haul. Neither from these two series, nor from the
Commission's ton-mile and revenue per ton-mile series, nor from all com-
bined, is it possible to develop "Railroad Rate Levels," the title of the chart
in the exhibit. The data are tortured to produce what is shown on the chart.
To measure rate changes through time with even reasonable accuracy, it is
necessary to segregate the changes in the rates as such from the changes in the
consist (the relative importance) of the thousands of commodities carried and
also from the changes in the lengths of haul, which vary widely from com-
modity to commodity and from year to year. Otherwise, the purported
changes in rate levels measure changes not only in rates but also in the
consist of commodities and distances hauled. Although an attempted adjust-
ment for length of haul was made by the witness who prepared the chart, the
extended cross examination by the carriers and from the bench suffices to
indicate the unreliability of the figures as a measure of rate levels.1 60
164. Huntington, p. 485.
165. 272 I.C.C. 695 (1948).
166. Transcript of Record, pp. 2878A-2897, Ex pare No. 168, Increased Freight Rates,
1948, 272 I.C.C. 695 (1948). The following excerpts are in point:
"Q.... For the year 1939 the railroad index, according to your method, is 155.6;
isn't that right? A. Yes. Q. The railroad index for 1945 is 173.8? A. That is
right. Q. Was there any substantial or significant index increases [sic], railroad-
wise, in 1945 as against 1939? A. No. Q. Nevertheless, the use of this method of
yours produces an 18 point elevation, isn't that so? A. That is correct. Q. Isn't
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At intervals over two decades or more, the Commission's staff experimented
with the development of an index which would measure actual changes in
rate levels. The problem of eliminating changes in consist and length of haul
proved baffling, although the Commission, with considerable effort, did de-
velop indexes for anthracite coal, bituminous coal, and iron ore. It was not
until 1947, when the Commission began its collection of a one percent sample
of railroad waybills, that it became possible to produce a satisfactory measure-
ment of changes in rate level per se, eliminating the extraneous elements men-
tioned above.16 7 Other criticisms of the chart will be passed over.
The author himself says: "The actual increase in the rate level from 1946 to
1950 was 35.6 percent," as against a much larger increase in "basic freight
rates." By "actual increase," he refers undoubtedly to changes in revenue
per ton-mile, the use of which for rate level measurement has been criticized
above. On the other hand, the cumulative authoriced 78.9 percent advance
in "basic freight rates" from February, 1938, through May, 1952,1cs is no
indication of the increase which shippers actually pay. In the same period,
wholesale prices increased 115 percent.
It is, moreover, economically unsound and impossible to test changes in rate
levels by reference to changes in price levels. Railroad costs, not prices in
general, must be considered. If the Commission were to follow the author's
advocacy, rates would fluctuate greatly in some periods, whereas _,hippers and
other interests find stability of rates essential in business planning.1 c9 The
that undoubtedly a reflection of the change in consist, length of haul beyond what
your method appears to adjust for? A. It is a reflection of the increased portion
of the high grade manufactured, miscellaneous, and l.cl. .. ." Id. at 2,S5A-2 S6A.
And again:
"Q. And if no increase was made in the rates on any of the commodities on the
railroads in those intervening years, but nevertheless your method produces an
increase from 155, as an index, to 173, you still find no infirmity in the method?
A. You still find that the average went up, yes. Q. Did this go up in spite of the
fact that the Commission had not authorized any increases? How did v:e raise
the rates? A. It went up because you sold more high-priced units. Q. Well, that
means, then, because we transported a higher percentage of high-priced com-
modities than we had transported in the earlier period, it is your position that
freight rates have increased, even though the rates on specific commodities have
not been increased? A. That is right.. " Id. at 2M7A.
167. See BunxAu oF TRANsPoRT Ecoxoics A D STATISTICS, IND-'ES OF Av-"c
FRm-aHT RATES ox RAILRoAD CARLOAD TR.xFrc, 1947-19:0 (Statement No. 515G, Oct.
1951). This analysis shows that rates actually paid on carload traffic increased 25 percent,
1947 to 1950. In the same period the increase in wholesale prices was 18.6 percent. See,
however, following text paragraph on this page.
163. That is, from the month prior to the one in which the 1938 increase became
effective. The increase made in 1942 and removed in 1943 may be disregarded here.
169. See Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 276 I.C.C 9, 43-5 (1943).
The subject of "flexible freight rates," i.e., rates which fluctuate with prices, has re-
ceived scattered discussion from time to time. See Duncan, Flexible Railway Freight Rates,
30J. Am. STAT. Ass'N 537-48 (1935).
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Commission must set rates which are just and reasonable in themselves, which
represent an equitable distribution of the burden among classes of traffic,
and which, in the aggregate, provide adequate support for the carriers. Where
costs have gone up, where operations are conducted with economy and
efficiency, and where the carriers are earning less than a reasonable return,
the Commission has the responsibility of granting increases, if they will pro-
duce the financial result desired and if the resulting rates will be just and
reasonable. The author would have a difficult time proving that for any ex-
tended period since 1920 the railroads have earned as much as a fair return
on a reasonable rate base. State commissions regularly have allowed public
utilities a greater return than the railroads have averaged. 170 The railroads
never have ceased criticizing the Commission for its "niggardliness." 171
Actually, earnings potentials have been affected by conditions beyond the
control of either the Commission or the railroads, such as mounting external
competition and different degrees of utilization of capacity among railroads,
Since Dr. Huntington feels that the Commission was slow to recognize
increases in wholesale prices in 1911-18 (though increased traffic volume
lessened the need for rate advances) and failed in the Twenties and Thirties
to reduce rates or prevent increases as the general price level fell, how can
he consistently criticize the Commission for advancing rates with unseemly
haste (as he implies) after World War II ?172 While he mentions the 10 per-
cent reduction ordered in 1922, he complains that rates were not cut further
in a period of agricultural distress of the Twenties (although he refers to
what the Commission attempted to do for shippers under the Hoch-Smith
Resolution). The railroads came out of the first World War with run-down
properties, and severe and costly car shortages occurred. It is not true that
the 1920 increase favored the railroads. Earnings in this period helped railroads
to acquire credit which permitted a large modernization program beginning in
1923.17 The country profited greatly from this program. On the other hand,
the author fails to reflect the significance of the Commission's denial of a
170. See SmiTH, THE FAIR RATE OF REuIuRN IN PuBuc UTILITY REGuLAIOxN (1932),
especially Appendix A; MuELER & COVER, RATES OF RETURN, CLASS I LINE-HAu, RAM.-
WAYS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1921-48, pp. 82, 85-90 (1950).
171. See testimony of W. S. Franklin in Hearings, infra note 179, at 868-70. Railway
Age, whose favorable remarks about the Commission are pointed to by Dr. Huntington,
frequently has editorialized about the Commission's decisions in rate level proceedings.
See, e.g., The Railways' Shrunken Margin of Profits, July 16, 1951, p. 29; The Public
Must Be Shown How Rate Regulation Has Failed, Sept. 3, 1951, p. 35. No doubt, such
editorials have been well received by the railroads themselves.
172. If, as the author states, "administered prices" normally involve a lag, why does
he ignore this lag in discussing the latter part of the period 1911-18? Wholesale prices
(1913=100) declined slightly in 1914 and 1915, averaged 122.5 percent of the 1913 level
in 1916, 168.3 percent in 1917, and 188.1 percent in 1918. Except for a drop in 1911, prieces
in 1910-13 were very steady. See pp. 174-5 supra.
173. Investment in new lines, extensions, and additions, less retirements, 1921-32,
$6,309,117,000. Sm. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
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15 percent increase in 1931 1T4 and a further denial in 1935 -1-with only
small advances allowed and on a temporary basis-or its concern over the
impact of increased rates on shippers.170 Another point not to be overlooked
is that wage rates as a rule do not come down when prices in general de-
cline.177 Wage costs and the greater burden of fixed costs during a period
of low traffic associated with price recessions tend to militate against rate
reductions.
But what are the facts as to the alleged "ease with which the railroads
in recent years have obtained advances in rates and fares from the ICC"? The
railroads certainly do not share Dr. Huntington's view. s78 Recently the
president of the Pennsylvania Railroad testified on two pending bills:
S. 2518, to enable the railroads, on a showing of increased costs, to place
general increases in rates in effect on thirty days' notice without suspension
but subject to subsequent review by the Commission; and S. 2519, to amend
Section 15a to put a more positive duty on the Commission to enable rail-
roads to earn adequate returns. The witness said in effect that the Com-
mission had been not only too slow but too niggardly in granting rate in-
creases in the face of advances in railroad costs.'-, Such phrases as "this
whole sorry story" and "too little and too late" are indicative of the railroad
position. The Commission did not approve S. 2518 or S. 2519.2'- Legislation
of the kind proposed in S. 2518 does not help the author's thesis.
.Moreover, both water carriers (commonly parties to the rail proceedings
and receiving the same rate increase authorizations) and motor carriers have
derived great benefits by "following the rails up." In fact, to be consistent
with his "affiliation" thesis, the author should be able to point out that the
Commission has not allowed increases in water and motor rate levels or, if
such increases have been permitted, to show that railroads were not in fact
entitled to rail rate increases under similar circumstances. He does neither
of these things.
174. 178 I.C.C. 539 (1931).
175. 208 I.C.C. 4 (1935).
176. See pp. 178-9 supra.
177. Reductions in railroad wage rates were made in 1921 and 1922, and a 10 percent
reduction, effective February 1, 1932, was restored on April 1, 1935. Cost-of-living adjust-
ments are a very recent development.
178. XV. T. Farcy, president, Association of American Railroads, said in 1943: "These
lags are terribly serious when you consider that a wage increase of 1 cent an hour across
the board... means an added expense of $40,000,000 a year.... So, when you have a gogd-
sized wage increase, say a 15 cent increase, you have $600,000,000 of extra expenses:'
Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Connerce on National
Transportation Policy, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1948).
179. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Forcign Cominerce or, Bills
Relative to Domestic Land and Water Transporlation, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. C63-906 (1952).
Others testified to the same effect, id. at 915-47.
180. Id. at 1151-6; see also testimony of Commissioner J. Haden Alldredge, id. at 1156-8.
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The statement that since 1940 the Commission has granted all applications
for increases in railroad fares is substantially true as to other than commuta-
tion fares, although attention could have been called to the reductions ordered
in Passenger Fares and Surcharges.'5 ' Before the war and since the war's end,
railroads have rendered passenger service at a loss 182 and often at less than
out-of-pocket costs, with a resulting heavy burden on freight traffic; there is
little justice in forcing continuation of passenger service losses, which grow
as costs increase. The loss situation is as bad, if not worse, in the commuta-
tion field. The increases sought have been granted in various instances, but
here there also have been suspensions and partial approvals of proposed in-
creases. In some instances the Commission has ordered complete revisions
of fare structures.1
83
As to increases granted the Railway Express Agency, here again the prob-
lem was one of mounting labor and other costs and declining traffic. Pay-
ments to railroads for their part of the service were substantially below the
cost the rails incurred; in fact, some railroads were getting nothing. Not
to have granted increases would have contributed to the demise of an agency
whose service is needed by many shippers or would have prolonged the
unjustified heavy losses of the railroads. 8 4 The increases by no means
eliminated these losses. Moreover, not all requests were allowed.18 6 Why
are these facts ignored?
Conflict with other groups. Finally, we are told that the increases granted
the railroads brought the Commission into conflict with other groups.180
First, it is not so obvious as the author supposes that shippers were opposed
to general rate increases. Shippers were not disposed, broadly speaking, to
object to the early postwar advances. 8 7 Their opposition became greater as the
increases cumulated, though some of the objections in the later proceedings
were primarily directed to the form an increase might take.' 88 The citations
to substantiate the charge that there has been "'considerable criticism'" of
the increases since 1946 are found to be general statements readily answered
by reference to the advances in railroads' labor and other costs. Strangely
181. 214 I.C.C. 174 (1936).
182. See 65 ICC ANN. RE. 41-3 (1951) ; Monthly Comment (Bureau of Transport
Economics and Statistics), May, 1951, pp. 1-5. "Passenger service" refers to passenger-
train service, which includes mail, express, etc.
183. See Chicago, S.S. & S.B.R.R. Fares, 279 I.C.C. 663 (1950); Commutation Fares
between Chicago and Wisconsin, 279 I.C.C. 773 (1950) ; and Illinois Central Multiple Fares
in Chicago Area, 281 I.C.C. 537 (1951).
184. See Commissioner Knudson's concurring opinion in Increased Express Rates and
Charges, 1951, 283 I.C.C. 431, 492-3 (1951).
185. See Increased Express Rates on Fruits and Vegetables, 279 I.C.C, 741 (1950);
Fish between Midwest and Eastern Points, 284 I.C.C. 47 (1952).
186. Huntington, pp. 486-7.
187. See Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 264 I.C.C. 695, 715-16 (1946).
188. See Increased Freight Rates, 1951, 284 I.C.C. 589, 635, 646, 655 (1951).
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enough, under "shipper interests" the author refers primarily to the appear-
ance of various federal departments as parties to rate proceedings. In some
instances, these departments are interested as shippers, but they more gener-
ally appear in behalf of particular sectors of the economy. Whatever con-
tribution they may make is considered along with other evidence; the Act
permits and requires no more.
Secondly, the important facts in the "running battle between OPA and
ICC" throughout most of the war are: (1) the Commission had its own re-
sponsibilities but did what it could to lessen the pyramiding of prices follow-
ing rate increases, and (2) except for a brief period, it allowed no general
increase in rail freight rates.'5 9
Thirdly, the Commission is said to have come into conflict with state and
local interests. The differences are less than the author supposes. Although
delay often occurs, most states usually follow Commission increases with
like changes in intrastate rates.190 Since intrastate transportation costs usually
increase as much as interstate costs and since the two areas of transportation
are largely indistinguishable-which facts the records in such proceedings
usually show-differential treatment of intrastate rates is not justified except
in special circumstances. Where conflict does result, it often involves questions
of discrimination between intrastate and interstate shippers. But the fact that
conflicts occur is not a valid criticism of the Commission. 9 1
Expansion of the Commission's Powcrs
The author's presentation on this subject does not rise much above a super-
ficial statement of how the sides lined up; he does nut consider the economic
realities which gave rise to the legislation he mentions. His most important sub-
division relates to legislation providing for ICC regulation of motor carriers
(1935) and water carriers (1940), which he attributes to railroad and Com-
mission efforts. The findings as to motor transport conditions and needs
made by Commissioner Eastman as Federal Coordinator of Transportation 1
2
189. See Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1942, 24S I.C.C. 545, 571
(1942); Increases in Te-as Rates, Fares, and Charges, 253 I.C.C. 723, 733-7 (1942); In-
creased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1942, 255 I.C.C. 357, 363-71, 394-5 (1943);
Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 4S9 (1944).
190. See Hearings, supra note 70, at 259-63, for tabulation presented by railroad wit-
nesses.
191. In stating that "railroads have generally favored the growth of ICC authority
at the expense of state regulatory agencies," the author might have mentioned railroads'
strong opposition to federal regulation of the sizes and weight of motor vehicles. See
Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Comuwrce on S. 2015, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 442-55 (1942) ; and testimony of witness Mackie in Hcarings. supra note 70, at 1S-1.
192. See SmE. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-27 (1934). The Coordinator's c-n-
clusion was that "there is a rather general demand for Federal regulation of motor carriers,
although views differ as to how far control of truck rates should go and as to numerous
details of regulation." Id. at 27. For summary of views on federal regulation and co-
ordination, see id. at 227-35.
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are not analyzed. The Coordinator fully considered the viewpoints of the
carriers, shippers, states, and other interests, and he succeeded in presenting
the problem to Congress in a convincing manner. The 1935 legislation, a
culmination of many earlier Congressional inquiries and a reflection of state
experience, received thorough consideration from every angle. The Senate
committee in charge said :193
"Federal regulation . . . has the support of the Coordinator, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the State commissions, 0 4 the bus
industry, a large part of the shippers, and of the trucking concerns.
. . . Carriers for hire, of all types, generally concede the need for
public regulation in some form. They want some restraining hand."
The stark economic fact is that the transportation of goods by motor
carriers was being conducted under conditions which resembled those of
jungle warfare. The industry was generally lacking in stability, responsi-
bility, reasonable assurance of earning power, and safety of operation on the
highways. Shippers in many instances were attempting to set motor carriers
against one another 103 and against railroads, and other shippers were coni-
plaining about the undesirable features of motor service. With increasing
injury being inflicted on the railroads, the alternatives were relaxation of
railroad regulation (so that railroads could meet motor carriers on an equal
footing) or regulation of motor carriers.10 The unwisdom of the first course
was widely conceded. Motor truck regulation was needed, however, quite
apart from railroad difficulties, for the industry was periodically destroying
and remaking itself. That the railroads, themselves highly regulated, approved
this legislation is neither surprising nor indicative of more than an effort to
get simple justice; in any case, their advocacy and that of the Commission
could not alone have effected passage of the legislation. 19
193. SEN. RE'. No. 482, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1935).
194. They were "strongly urging . . . Federal regulation to 'stop the gaps' in State
regulation and to enable them more effectively to regulate intrastate transportation .2.
Ibid.
195. See SEN. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1934).
196. "This [motor carrier] competition has been carried to an extreme which tends to
undermine the financial stability of the carriers and jeopardizes the maintenance of trans-
portation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the
public interest. The present chaotic transportation conditions are not satisfactory to in-
vestors, labor, shippers, or the carriers themselves." SEx. REP. No. 482, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.,
2 (1935).
197. "The demand for regulation of the motor-transport industry began with the rail-
roads, spread at length to the industry itself, and is now voiced by an important segment of
public opinion." SEN. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934). The bus industry had
been ready for federal regulation for some time; while the coordinator found "there is little
disagreement as to the need for Federal regulation," the industry wished to see what code
regulation could accomplish. Id. at 25.
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Legislation extending the scope of water carrier regulation had a somewhat
similar history. More water carriers and shippers favored effective regula-
tion than the author's statement indicates.1 08 The needs of one branch of the
industry had caused passage of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, and ex-
tension of the Act to common carriers on the Great Lakes and in coast-
wise trades in 1938.109 The 1939 Senate report clearly indicated the prob-
lems resulting from incomplete regulation of water transportation. -0  The
Commission interposed no objection to the addition of many exemptions
which made the regulatory coverage far less extensive than the author recog-
nizes.
2 01
What have been the effects of regulation of motor and water carriers?
The motor carrier industry has progressed as it never could have without
the better ordering of its affairs, which Commission regulation has made
possible. The industry's growth in business, public acceptance, and investments
has been remarkable ;202 the railroads have a stronger competitor to deal with
than they perhaps anticipated. The effects of water carrier regulation have been
obscured by the interruptions in service during World War II and by the
basically adverse economic conditions in certain branches of the industry
198. Id. at 164-9.
199. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 5-7. This regulation was less compre-
hensive as to subject matter than that passed in 1940.
200. "This [regulation] is not for the purpose of favoring one form of transportation
over another or seeking to put any form of transportation out of business; it is, as stated,
simply to put them all on a common basis or common starting point in their sharp struggle
for business. S. 2009 seeks to do this also. If one or more forms of transportation cannot
survive under equality of regulation, they are not entitled to survive. This is not railroad
philosophy; it is transportation philosophy. The problem is not a railroad problem, but, is,
as the Interstate Commerce Commission has said, a transportation problem." SE... Ru'.
No. 433, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939).
Referring to rail efforts to obtain repeal of the fourth section, to which repeal water
carriers objected, the Committee said: "[I]t was admitted by opponents of the bill that rail-
roads free from any regulation could destroy or seriously impair the business of its com-
petitors. It is necessary then to regulate rail carriers to insure a sound transportation system
for this Nation. And the position taken by water carriers that railroads must ha regulated,
and they should not, though they compete on rights-of-way improved and largely main-
tained by public funds, is wholly inconsistent and completely untenable." Id. at 3.
201. See MORG.Ax, op. cit. supra note 125, pt. I. This was a report made in connection
with a proceeding, Ex pare 165, instituted to obtain information on the effects of the exemp-
tions and the war on conditions in domestic water transportation. The Commission too!: no
action to carry out the recommendations for conditional removal of the "bull: exemptions"
made in the report.
202. Ton-miles of intercity carriers increased 222 percent and the revenue from intercity
traffic 372 percent, 1939 to 1950; for railroads, the increase in ton-miles was 76.5 percent
and in freight revenues 141 percent. Operating revenues of intercity and local ICC carriers
advanced 345 percent, while revenues of class I line-haul railroads increased 137 percent.
For passenger carriers the revenue increase was 219 percent. Monthly Comment, Oct. 12,
1951, p. 12; Nov. 14, 1951, p. 12.
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since the war.20 3 As for the shippers, their interest in motor rate proceedings
is shown by their strong and increasing protests against rate increases.
204
In discussing rail efforts to transfer Civil Aeronautics Board functions to
the Commission 205 and subsequent attempts to place all regulatory and pro-
motional work in the ICC, the author neglects to mention that neither of
these proposals has received Commission support. 20
The author concedes at last that interests other than railroads "have at
times supported individual actions of the Commission or defended the Com-
mission against specific attempts to curb its authority. But such action," he
adds, "on the part of these interests has always been sporadic and balanced
by severe criticism of the Commission and opposition to it in other lines of
policy. ' 20 7 No documentation accompanies this profound understatement.
FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT, NONPOLITICAL
AND UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION
In line with his thesis of Commission dependence on the railroads for
"viability," Dr. Huntington states that "the attitude of the railroads towards
the Commission since 1935 can only be described as one of satisfaction,
approbation, and confidence. '208 He does cite a staff report to the Hoover
Commission to the effect that "carriers may be highly critical of and dissatis-
fied with particular decisions"; also cited are critical articles by Robert R.
Young. But a vast array of criticism, some previously noted in these com-
ments, is reduced to a single footnote. How can the quoted statement be
reconciled with complaints of the railroads about the Commission's "too little
and too late" policy in their testimony before a Senate Committee,20 09 about
undue ICC liberality in granting operating rights to motor and water carriers, 10
203. See p. 194 .sipra.
204. See, e.g., Minimum Charges per Shipment from East to New England, 48 M.C.C.
733 (1948) ; opposition of shipper organizations to 6 percent increase proposed by Midwest
Motor Freight Bureau, reported in Traffic World, June 28, 1952, p. 47; similar protests as
to 6 percent increase proposed by Central and Southern Motor Tariff Association. Traffie
World, Feb. 2, 1952, p. 17. The opportunity to prove undue prejudice in motor rates Is some-
what limited. See Zion Industries, Inc. v. Webber Cartage, Inc., 32 M.C.C. 322 (1942);
Middle West General Increases, 48 M.C.C. 541, 553 (1948).
205. A 1946 survey of opinion showed considerable support for a single agency: "Single
versus separate regulatory agencies.The consensus of opinion of carriers and other re-
spondents is largely in favor of a single regulatory agency. The carriers now regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission favor a single agency. The air lines, supervised now by
a separate regulatory agency, wish to maintain the status quo. Users of transportatioll
largely favor the single regulatory agency." H. REP. No. 2735, 79th Cong., 2d Sess, pt. I,
ix (1946).
206. See p. 219 infra.
207. Huntington, pp. 480-1.
208. Huntington, p. 473.
209. See note 171 supra.
210. See Hearings, supra note 70, at 277-8, 349, 1422.
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and about undue restrictiveness in granting rights for rail-motor operations 211
and in rate,21- reorganization, Section 5, and other proceedings?
Railroad support of the Commission is said to consist, in part, of defense
of ICC independence. In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative
LManagement recommended placing the Commission's "administrative section"
and that of other regulatory agencies in a cabinet department and also
placing the ICC "judicial section" there for "housekeeping" purposes. "These
proposals raised a storm of protest from the ICC-railroad bloc and legislation
to effect them was defeated ... ."213 The implication is that this "bloc" was
the decisive factor. But the author's own citations supply proof of opposition
of shippers, the state commissions, and others.21' These groups, as well as
the railroads, understandably fear decisions influenced by political com idera-
tions. The same observations apply to Dr. Huntington's attempt to ascribe
primarily to the railroads the defeat of the move to place the Commission
under a permanent chairman to be appointed by the president. Ra*lroads.
shared the opposition with American Trucking Associations, Inc.,215 and
others. Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, strongly opposed the measure as tending to
lessen the Commission's independence and as an infringement on the pre-
rogatives of Congress. Could it not be that Congress was willing to give
weight to the judgment of the Commission, oldest and most experienced of
the regulatory agencies, as to how its internal operations could best be
conducted? Again, railroad "opposition to the creation of new agencies
which might rival the I.C.C." was shared by others who realize the need of
undivided authority.
Railroad opposition to the appearance of federal departments before the
Commission (principally in general rate cases) is a natural attitude, which is
shared by other groups. Such appearances consume time, and delays in
these proceedings cost millions in revenue. While the railroads doubtless
concede that special circumstances may require such presentations, they
211. Id. at 250-2, 1417-8. See also pp. 187-8 supra.
212. See the far-reaching Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 281 I.C.C. 213 (1951). and
prior decisions.
213. Huntington, p. 474.
214. See testimony, in Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Govo.v:xnt Re-
organization on S. 2700. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), of witnesses for National Industrial
Traffic League, at 212-14, 250-1; for New Jersey Industrial Traffic League, at 246-9; for
National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, at 224-33; and for Asso-
ciation of ICC Practitioners, at206-11.
215. The A.T.A. witness said: 'While Reorganization Plan No. 7 is a step in the right
direction, so far as removing from the Commission the burden of administrative detail is
concerned, we believe the value of this streamlining is outweighted by a possibility, even
the probability, that the judicial processes may be subjected to political influence." Hearings
before Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departmcnit on S. Res.
253-6, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1950).
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feel that the Commission can reach proper decisions by considering the views
of the carriers and shippers directly involved. In this connection, the author
also states: "Attempts by existing agencies to influence or dictate ICC policy
through intervention in proceedings before the Commission, informal pressure
upon commissioners, or by other means, have been severely attacked by the
railroads. '216 It suffices here to italicize language which appears to recognize
neither statutory duties nor ethics in interagency relations.
More is said in these pages about the matters here briefly discussed.
CoMMISSION PROCEDURES
While he devotes little space to this subject, the author finds that the
Commission "has maintained an outdated, formalistic type of procedure."
Also: "It has been slow to introduce the most simple and accepted new
techniques of modem management. It has failed to develop effective devices
for representing the public interest. '217 As he has made no personal investi-
gation of the subject, we must see if the sources cited justify his remarks.
Cited on the first point is a monograph on the Commission prepared for
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941), in
which the praise given the Commission (as a result of firsthand study) far
outweighs the criticism offered.218 Next cited is a Hoover Commission staff
report on the ICC. At the pages mentioned one finds reference to the
substantial periods consumed in some proceedings and the considerable celerity
in disposing of others; to ICC efforts to reduce delays; to various difficulties
and obstacles encountered; to the Commission's effort to obviate appeals to
the courts and to strengthen its position in the event such appeals are made; to
the general avoidance of "experimentation where economic objectives may ap-
pear to conflict with interpretations of the law" ;219 and to Commission concern
over the legality of less formal procedures in certain types of cases. These
comments scarcely support the author's serious criticism. The source next
216. Huntington, pp. 476-7 (emphasis added).
217. Huntington, p. 507.
218. The principal criticism had to do with unduly long records as the result of the
Commission's practice of allowing parties opportunity for complete hearing. The Committee
recommended greater use of depositions, affidavits, and "canned testimony" and noted the
possibility of making greater use of prehearing conferences in certain proceedings, especially
in the legislative type of investigations. There were other criticisms of specific procedural
steps. Many of the changes proposed were offered as mere suggestions for the Commission
to consider. (The Committee also made suggestions to other agencies.) On the other hand,
there was much praise for Commission practices: for example, the shortened procedure, "no
hearing," or "modified procedure" devices developed by the Commission; the use of the
examiner's proposed report system in most formal proceedings; the work of the Bureau of
Informal Cases ("an achievement of great worth") ; other use of informal methods; and
the prehearing conference method used in valuation work ("an overwhelming success").
219. This point raises primarily policy questions and as such does not call for dis-
cussion here.
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cited is a Commission statement of its position on important matters.2- 0 Also
cited is an article terming Commission procedure in railroad reorganizations
"stiff" and "legalistic." The merits of this criticism will not be analyzed ex-
cept to say that decisions rendered under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
must be reviewed by the courts and that the issues are most controversial.
The Mahaffie Act- 2' was passed in 1948 to enable a "streamlining" of
reorganization cases which can be disposed of on a voluntary basis; court
approval is unnecessary.
The evidence cited actually indicates that the Commission has continued to
do pioneering work in developing more effective procedures. It has benefited
by constructive criticism and recognizes the need for using all reasonable
means of reducing the time consumed in hearings. But it has had to adopt
procedures which might not be necessary if it had a lighter work load, per-
mitting greater consideration of each case's procedural needs, and if it had a
more uniformly experienced bar with which to deal. Attorneys could lighten
the Commission's task substantially by not insisting on formal proceedings
where other means would suffice and by not prolonging proceedings unduly.
The author's second criticism has to do with slowness in adopting "the most
simple and accepted new techniques of modern management." The sources cited
do not justify this criticism. One of these sources notes certain exceptional cases
where work has been shifted between bureaus, but Dr. Huntington could
not have known all of the circumstances. And some of this "streamlining"
for greater efficiency would run afoul of the author's own criticism of the
Commission for having merged work of the Bureau of Motor Carriers with
kindred work of other bureaus. The Commission has, however, utilized staff
work to achieve greater efficiency, 2-"  and it is undertaking to establish a
position of executive director.
As in the case of other government agencies, there always has been op-
portunity for greater efficiency in the Commission's operations. Efficiency,
however, is not the sole test of successful conduct of this type of work. The
220. The Commission said: "It is reasonable to conclude that... Congress has had in
mind the principles governing our actions laid dovn by the courts over the long years of
the Commission's functioning, and has approved the procedures developed." Mention was
made specifically of the requirement as to hearing or opportunity for hearing, of basing
decisions on the record as made, of the duty which rests on the Commission to see that th
facts essential to the preparation of orders are in the record, and, to this end, of the need
for adequate funds and freedom from unnecessary restraint.
221. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b (Supp. 1950).
222. This has involved a large number of detailed steps, but they add up to important
savings in time and effort. Passage of SEN. REs. 332, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 26, 1952),
authorized the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to study the organi-
zation and operation of the Commission. This study, made in part by an outside agency,
should be helpful to the Commission. It does not involve considerations on the policy level,
but has to do with management and efficiency problems; it does not signify that other
agencies would not benefit from similar studies.
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Commission has been painstaking in its efforts to give all parties every oppor-
tunity to have their problems thoroughly considered. It never has been criti-
cized as bureaucratic, though it could have gained in efficiency had it been
willing to follow a course which would lead to so unwelcome a designation.
The statement that the Commission "has failed to develop effective devices
for representing the public interest" relies for support in part on an article on
judicial notice. This question is not a new one for the Commission. While
in sympathy with the idea that it should make greater use of data not of
record, it was so severely admonished on this subject by the Supreme Court
that it had to reverse an earlier policy which it deemed in the public interest.
""a
The inference in the other source that the Commission does not take notice
of its own decisions unless they are cited of record is definitely in error.
Records in other proceedings must, of course, be stipulated. Also, the state-
ment in this source that the Commission does not inquire to any very con-
siderable extent into related rates when particular rates are in issue under-
estimates what has been done, although present staff limitations do impede
such inquiry. Greater use of staff testimony, urged by one of the writers
cited, involves the possibility that a staff member, in presenting the results
of his work, would sometimes appear to be supporting one side at the expense
of the other. There are advantages, however, that make the subject worthy
of further consideration.
THE QUESTION OF THE COMIISSION'S "VIABILITY"
With the foregoing survey of the record, it is possible to evaluate the
author's contention concerning the "decreasing viability" of the Commission
and his proposal for a different regulatory setup for transportation.
The Meaning of "Viability '
Dr. Huntington's statement on the meaning of "viability" needs to be set
out in full:
"Successful adaptation to changing environmental circumstances
is the secret of health and longevity for administrative as well as
biological organisms. Every government agency must reflect to some
degree the 'felt needs' of its time. In the realm of government, felt
needs are expressed through political demands and political pres-
sures. These demands and pressures may come from the president,
other administrative agencies and officials, congressmen, political
interest groups, and the general public. If an agency is to be viable
it must adapt itself to the pressures from these sources so as to
maintain a net preponderance of political support over political oppo-
sition. It must have sufficient support to maintain and, if necessary,
expand its statutory authority, to protect it against attempts to
abolish it or subordinate it to other agencies, and to secure for it
223. See AT'ORNFY GENERAL'S Comm=rr, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ComMlssIoit
81-5 (Monograph No. 24, 1941).
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necessary appropriations. Consequently, to remain viable over a
period of time, an agency must adjust its sources of support so as to
correspond with changes in the strength of their political pressures.
If the agency fails to make this adjustment, its political support de-
creases relative to its political opposition, and it may be said to suffer
from administrative marasmus. The decline of the ICC may be
attributed to its susceptibility to this maladv." 221
This "agency support theory" appears to have attained the status of an
axiom for some political scientists. The author cites what anounts to a handbook
of tactics which government agencies can use to get ah-ad or at least hold on
in the battle of the bureaus. The theory, of course, is not without its elements
of truth. It is very essential, however, to distinguish among government
agencies.
Apparently, the type of agency most clearly subject to the -viability"
doctrine is one which caters to the interests of a particular group, such as
agriculture, business, or labor. It is not difficult to see that failure to please
the mother group would cause trouble for the agency. As the relative
political strengths of such groups change from time to time, it is possible
for one agency's activities to be cut down while another's expand. Certain
other agencies have had their origin in well-intended efforts tu advance the
general public interest but never have gained solid support; they may be
put out of business by espousing programs which do not accord with the
temper of the dominant party. There is, uf course, an essential continuing
scrutiny of the worth-whileness of the activities of all government agencies.
So much may be granted in the way of broad generalizations. At this point
it is necessary, however, to distinguish further among government agencies.
The Commission is one of several which have quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative,
and administrative functions, but is unique in that its work comprehends
several modes of transportation. It is not a court of law, but most of its work
should be appraised in the same manner as is the work of courts. In both
instances there is the consideration of controversial issues on an open record,
fairly made under established rules. Parties can "go to court" in either
instance, but they must leave politics behind. Whatever political demands
and pressures exist must be directed at Congress instead. The Commission
must act in the coldest neutrality, '2  as must a court. Every decision, even
certain special ones,220 must reflect the public interest as expressed in the
statute. To seek favorable reactions to its decisions would be the quickest
224. Huntington, p. 470.
225. ICC v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910).
226. Suits for reparation might be considered a possible cxeetion, but an von?
similarly affected may take advantage of a decision, tlough not a party. Swe A. J. Phillips
Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 236 U.S. 662 (1915). Se alo Pennsyhania RR. v.
Stineman Coal Mlining Co., 242 U.S. 298 (1916). Both cases V.Lre cited by former Com-
missioner Clyde B. Aitchison, at Hcarings before Subcommittee on Sc:ate Con;mittc on the
Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1941).
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possible way for the Commission to destroy itself. Harsh decisions must be
rendered and criticism invited-including much which quickly reaches the
ears of Congress. This criticism may be carried to such extremes as to
cause uninformed persons to question the ability and disinterestedness of the
Commission. But unpopularity is a penality which must be paid if the
administrative type of regulation is to be preserved. The alternative is a
political type of regulation, under which the political minority expects losses
and bides its time. It is not pleasant to contemplate the effects on the nation
of a political administration of transportation regulation.
Yet there are steps the Commission could properly take to improve its
standing, particularly with respect to securing adequate appropriations. As
in the case of the courts, ICC does not defend its decisions against attack;
they must speak for themselves. The Commission, however, might encourage
wider publicity of its decisions, in view of their effects in all areas of the
country, and make more generally known the nature of Commission work and
the conditions under which it is conducted. Moreover, since the executive
branch of the government also has transportation problems to consider and
since transportation is an important segment of the total economy, it appears
to the writer that the Commission could foster mutual understanding and
exchange of information by increasing its contacts with the chief executive
and the departments concerned with transportation. ICC's relations with Con-
gress are, of course, reasonably close, but it is apparent that more could be
done with propriety to let members of Congress know of the Commission's
work and its problems.
What is the Commission's "Viability" Today?
Carriers and shippers. We now may turn to specific phases of this matter.
According to the author, the Commission has "alienated" motor and water
carriers, has no friends in civil aviation, and can command only "qualified
support from large shippers of the National Industrial Traffic League (which
has always been closely associated with the railroads)," while other shippers,
and agricultural groups in particular, are "generally hostile.
2- 7
We may first consider the motor carriers. As stated earlier, criticisms of
the ICC are often self-serving; they should not always be taken at face value.
According to the author's concept of viability, the ultimate tests are whether
the motor carrier industry is willing to ask Congress to reduce the Commis-
sion's funds, to cut down its powers, or to seek its displacement, presumably
by a more tractable agency, and, in addition, whether the industry can sell
any or all of these programs to Congress. The matter of funds will be discus-
sed presently. No instances of a serious motor carrier effort to reduce the
Commision's powers come to mind, though there have been charges in
Congress that the Commission has "flouted the intention of Congress" and
227. Huntington, pp. 505-6.
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resulting calls for more specific congressional directives in the interest of
motor or other carriers. Such directives, if enacted, would not necessarily be a
validation of the charges made, since the Commission has to live with the Act
and, as accurately as possible, reflect the intent of Congress as it presently
is made known in the Act. That it wilfully has flouted such intent would be
prima facie untrue and so wholly out of keeping with the traditions of the Com-
mission as to require the accuser to bear an impossible burden of proof. The
best proof, denunciation by Congress, is lacking. The intent of the law, how-
ever, is not always dearly discernible. If the Commission misjudges particular
statutory language, it desires to be put straight by the courts or Congress,
but meanwhile it can follow only its own understanding of the issues and the
law, with help from parties to proceedings. It obviously cannot be guided
by the wishes of a particular group. Nevertheless, it is believed that informed
motor carriers would conclude, if appropriately asked, that the Commission
has carried out a difficult job of motor carrier regulation with a commendable
degree of success. That greater success could have been achieved with more
funds is obvious. Motor carriers want the Commission to be able to do a
more effective job22s
There are differences in the attitudes of water carriers toward the Com-
mission, but, in view of the analysis previously offered,20 it appears that
many have been expecting the Commission to exercise more authority than
it has received. As appreciation of this fact grows, as water carriers more
thoroughly understand the bases of Commission decisions, and as some of
the carriers learn how to present their cases more effectively, it is reasonable
to expect wider realization of the value and need of regulation by the Com-
mission. We do not need to rate the "viability" of the Commission in the
field of air transportation, as. in the present writer's view, the Commission
is not asking to acquire regulatory control of air transportation.
To some extent, the attitude of shippers, as well as of carriers, depends on
how they are affected by particular Commission decisions. But on the whole,
year in and year out, shippers respect the Commission for its honest efforts
and fairness.
If, however, it can be said that any of these carrier or shipper groups are
"alienated," then railroads exhibit a similar degree of supposed "alienation."
As already indicated in several places, the railroads have ahvays mixed severe
criticism--especially of ICC administration of rate levels-with their public
expressions of respect.
228. The present position of motor carriers of property, as expressed by American
Trucking Associations, Inc., appears to be mainly that the earlier organization of the Com-
mission's work on a type-of-carrier basis should be restored. The different position taken
at Hearings, supra note 70, at 862-7, is erroneously assumed by the author to have repre-
sented the industry's views.
229. See pp. 194-5 supra.
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In general, however, members of the large family of carriers and shippers
over which the Commission presides gather together in strong support of
the Commission when attacks are made upon its independence. Instances have
been cited above. The recent efforts to secure more funds for the Commission
were shared by water and motor carriers, shippers, and others.2 350 This specific
test of "viability" has been met.
Other agencies. We are told next that the Commission's "affiliation" has
caused "alienation" of other government agencies. This "alienation" is said
to result in part from the close affiliation of these agencies with interest groups
in turn alienated from the Commission; but in more instances, "the Commis-
sion's espousal of the relatively narrow interests of the railroads has conflicted
with the responsibility felt by these other agencies to some broader interest
and their dependence upon some broader basis of support." 231 Only two
answers are necessary: the Commission gives any department its day in
court; the Commission must follow the law it administers and can not be
bound either by a foreign statute or by the policies of other agencies. It is
doubtful that most of the departments are in any sense "alienated," but if
such a situation exists, the fault lies not with the Commission.
Congress. While the matter of "subversion of congressional intent" has
been discussed above and, in effect, has been covered at many points through-
out this paper, "two examples of the results of Congress' fear that the ICC
was 'railroad-minded' "232 may be analyzed briefly. One is the Whittington
amendment of the declaration of national transportation policy.2 3 It is no
reflection on an agency long concerned principally with railroad regulation
that Congress should express itself as it did in the amendment. The fears
of other types of carriers were at least understandable. Moreover, there
is reason to believe that the amendment was intended to ensure that the
declaration would be treated as affirmative law and not as a preamble of little
weight. The other example is the 1940 incorporation in the "rate-making"
rules of a provision that the Commission shall give due consideration, in
prescribing rates, "to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the
carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed. '234 This language, Dr.
Huntington indicates, was used to prevent the Commission from bolstering
230. Among the more general presentations in behalf of the Commission, made without
solicitation on its part, were those of the American Trucking Associations, Inc., American
Waterways Operators, Inc., Freight Forwarder Institute, National Industrial Traffic
League, Association of Interstate Commerce Commission Practitioners, and National
Association of Motor Carrier Counsel. Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Corm-
mittee on Appropriations on H. R. 7072, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1134-42, 1144-56 (1952).
231. Huntington, p. 506.
232. Huntington, p. 507 n.179.
233. It reads: "All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with
a view to carrying out the above declarations of policy." 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
c. 1 (1946).
234. 54 STAT. 912 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 15a(2) (1946).
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other carriers' rates in order to protect the railroads. But in 1939, xhile
Section 216(d) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935-barring prejudice "to
the traffic of any [non-motor] carrier . . ."--was in effect, the Commissiun
had required the maintenance of a rail rate somewhat higher than the com-
petitive water-motor rate.235 In view of this decision, it can hardly be said
that the 1940 provision represented solely an attempt to protect motor and
water carriers against the railroads.
Limits to Commission Planning in Transportation
Dr. Huntington states that the Commission "has failed to develop a co-
herent transportation policy aside from giving the railroads what they -ant."
Earlier evidence disposes of "giving the railroads what they want." As to a
"coherent" policy, it must be repeated that the Commission, as an agency of
delegated powers, must confine itself to the authority specifically given it.
- 
NI
If the author refers to the "felt need" for coordination of Government regula-
tory and promotional policies,2 7 the answer must be that the Commission has
no authority in this field and has expressed a desire not to receive power in
areas which involve publicly-provided transportation facilities.23s Its expert
knowledge could be brought to bear on such matters,39 but it is for others to say
that ICC should engage in such work. Commission "viability" in Congress
would fall abruptly were it to seek such powers. But if the author means
coherence in policy governing matters presently entrusted to the Commission,
it may be said that the Commission implements the general statement of
congressional policy and the more specific provisions of the statutes, as
interpreted in various respects by the courts. Through "case law" evolution
235. Petroleum between Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, 234 I.CC. 09
(1939). See note 32 supra.
236. See 61 ICC AqNn. REP. 19 (1947).
237. See REroRr op SEcR.AxY oF Com.smmcn oN IssuEs INoLvEa n A MnimpFi mD
Coo-InATED FEDMAL PROGRAm IN TRAN.SPORTATIOx (1949) ; DE-AnRIN & OwM. NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION PoLIcy (1949).
238. See report of ICC's legislative committee, April 11, 1952, on S. 2744, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952), a bill which would authorize the Commission to pass on the economic
justification of certain inland waterway improvement projects. The Committee noted that
many such projects are of the multiple-purpose type and therefore involve economic con-
siderations outside the fields of transportation. It concluded that the bill "would place up-n
the Commission major duties that are alien to regulation of transportation" and opposed en-
actment. It similarly opposed enactment of S. 2743, to give it the duty of assessing tolls.
This duty, it said, would be "somewhat different and apart from [the Commission's] primary
function as a regulatory agency and which in a sense would be in conflict with that function:'
Aside from the difficulties presented, it considered such work "beyond the sphere of this
Commission's true functions." Hearings. supra note 66, at 1496-7.
239. A single instance of a report on a public transportation project, Report on Lake
Erie-Ohio River Canal, 235 I.C.C. 753 (1939), the result of a specific request of the Presi-
dent, is roundly condemned by the author, apparently without consideration of how the find-
ings were reached.
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and decisions based on general investigations, 240 it develops principles and
precedents for the guidance of all concerned. But ICC procedures are flex-
ible enough to enable adjustments to changing conditions; rigid policies would
be tantamount to bureaucracy.
Special circumstances, moreover, militate against such efforts as the Com-
mission may make under its delegated powers to bring more system into trans-
portation. Thus, the "grandfather" clauses caused a lack of control, which
permits only those improvements in the basic transportation pattern which
can be achieved through grants or denials of applications to engage in or ex-
pand transport operations, or to unify existing operations. 241 Also, the Com-
mission has no control over the number of motor vehicles or vessels a carrier
may operate under its rights. Finally, there are important exemptions in the
acts the Commission administers.
The author's illustrations of failure "to develop a coherent transportation
policy" are not helpful. They have to do with slowness in dealing with
"obvious evils, such as the freight classification problem or the question of
state limitations on truck sizes and weights." Under Commission pressure,
a uniform national classification for rail traffic finally has been achieved. This
work and the development of uniform class rate scales applicable east of
Mountain Pacific territory-regarded by some as one of the Commission's
greatest achievements-required time, much of it consumed in overcoming
opposition and delaying tactics. As for the size-and-weight problem, the
Commission, by congressional direction, made a report and recommended
regulation under certain conditions.2 42 Railroad, state, and other opposition,
coupled with our entry into World War II, served to prevent complete con-
sideration of S. 2015, a bill drawn by the Commission's staff.243 Conditions
changed in the ensuing years. Motor carriers strongly urged that S. 2363, a
sizes-and-weight bill introduced by Senators Johnson and Bricker, not be
approved at this time.2 44 The problem has angles (such as load capacity of
roads and bridges) foreign to the Commission's assigned tasks.
The author refers to the fact that special agencies, such as the Federal
Coordinator of Transportation, have been set up to do work in transportation
planning, which he thinks the Commission has neglected. The limitations
of the Commission's functions in "planning" have been noted above. Plan-
ning studies, such as Transportation and National Policy of the defunct
240. Such as the investigation of class rates in large territories, of terminal allowances,
of the statutory exemptions, and of leasing practices .
241. To some extent the imperfections of the existing array of carriers are remedied
by the dropping out of marginal carriers.
242. FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE SIZES AND WEIGHT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, H.R. Doe,
354, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) ; see also 30 M.C.C. 777 (1941).
243. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Interstate C0nlerce
on S. 2015 77th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1941-42).
244. See Hearings, supra note 66, at 744-64, 786-7, 792-3, 799-800,
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National Resources Planning Board, necessarily embrace subjects (govern-
ment ownership of railroads and inland waterway improvements, for ex-
ample) which the Commission could not treat with propriety. Legislative
types of reports were made by some special agencies cited by the author.
It is highly desirable to obtain the views of varied interests on transportation
matters. Nevertheless, the Commission in its annual and special reports has
supplied a large volume of legislative recommendations, many of which have
been enacted into law. The Commission must recognize that its studies are
"official" and therefore tend to bind it in its later work. Even its staff studies
may end up in official proceedings and thus carry a weight of authority
which does not attach to analyses made by agencies with little or no responsi-
bility in transportation. The Commission recognizes, therefore, that it and its
staff cannot rove at will over the transportation field. There is need, however,
for more research work than it has been possible to do with available staff
manpower.
The Commission and National Defense
The further charge that the Commission has been "unable to adjust its
thinking and actions to the new demands of an era in which defense considera-
tions are paramount" 245 shows complete unfamiliarity with the facts. The
most important point is that the Commission has carried a large share of the
burden of wartime transport administration, including the issuance and en-
forcement of carloading orders and, through its field staff, the clearing up
of tight car or motor terminal situations. The Commission and the war
agencies supplement one another. The device of having a single defense
transport administrator has important advantages, but without the Commis-
sion's help and experience, he would be severely handicapped. All three such
administrators have been members of the Commission and, except Commis-
sioner Eastman, had been and continued to be the Commissioner in charge of
its Bureau of Service.2 40 Also, the Commission fully recognizes the need for
enabling carriers to equip themselves for war tasks; a decision of last April
clearly showed the importance it attaches to this need.-47 The defense e.stab-
lishment and others familiar with Commission work appreciate the ICC'-
contribution to the nation's war and defense efforts.
Judicial Review and Appropriations
Two additional attempts to show the "decreasing viability" of the Com-
mission are made. The author states that the Commission's decisions are
reversed in the courts more frequently than in the past. From 1936 to 1940,
it is said, the Commission was sustained in 93 percent of the cases in the
245. Huntington, p. 503.
246. The facts are stated fully in the Commiss, n's annual reports.
247. Increased Freight Rates, 1951, 234 I.C.C 5S9 (1952).
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Supreme Court "which involved the Commission or Commission action,"
whereas in 1941-45 the record was 82 percent, and in 1946-50 it was 74 per-
cent. Statistics of this kind do not prove a trend..2 48 Either reversals or affirm-
ances may be bunched in a given period. In addition, the late Commissioner
Eastman once said that the Commission would not be doing its duty if it
won all its cases; it should, he urged, test its powers in order to get ahead with
its task.Y9 In any case, most of the reversals mentioned by the author re-
sulted from the absence of findings in the Commission's reports. Funds with
which to enlarge the staff of examiners would help in this connection. If,
however, statistics are to be used, it would have been more informing if the
author had included the Commission's experience in the lower courts. And
while no data are readily available, it is apparent that an extremely small
percentage of all Commission decisions reach the courts.
The other point is that the Commission's appropriations and the number of
its employees have been stationary or declining. Its appropriations for gen-
eral expenses (of chief interest here) increased 25.8 percent from 1945-46 to
1952-53. Allowing for absorption of salary increases, there has been a slight de-
cline (0.8 percent) in effective funds. Average employment has declined 11.2
percent. Yet it cannot be said that the Commission has been singled out for
especially severe treatment; the emphasis on economy in government expendi-
tures has been of a general nature.210 Carriers, shippers, and others have
interceded for increased funds for ICC,25 1 as have members of Congress most
familiar with the Commission's work and needs, but these efforts have been of
relatively little avail in the face of programs to reduce federal appropriations
on the basis of general formulas. The Commission's conservative requests
for funds in past years, 2 5 2 an indication of its respect for the taxpayer's
money, have served it to no a4vantage. When cuts come, they affect the
Commission's work vitally. With adequate funds, we should hear little about
the Commission's "viability."
248. The author cites PRITCHETT, THE RooSEvELT COURT 177-80 (1948), where refer-
ence is made to 11 cases involving Commission orders. Six were won and 5 were lost (2 by
5-4 votes). It is quite evident, from the percentage which Dr. Huntington himself gives,
that there is something wrong with this comparison. A check of data presented by Dr.
Huntington has not been undertaken.
It seems that Pritchett has quoted expressions which appeared hostile to the Commission
-even though some of the cases in which this language appeared were won by the
Commission-and that in other cases he relied upon dissenting opinions.
249. The Commission's decisions and the presentations in their behalf were a large
factor in the establishment of the limits of judicial review of administrative proceedings,
a development which has benefited other regulatory agencies, federal and state.
250. See 65 ICC ANN. REP. 130-50 (1951), for an unusually frank statement of the
situation. The Commission concluded that it permanently needed about 1,300 more em-
ployees.
251. See p. 218 supra.
252. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION, STAFF REPORT ON THE INTERSTATE Co,-
mERcE CommissIoN 1-24 (1948).
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Conclusions as to the Commission's "Viabiliy"
The author has misconstrued or inaccurately presented evidence relating to
his thesis that the Commission's "viability" is decreasing. In any event, the
Commission's functioning cannot be gauged by the results of a pupularity poll.
Since its beginning it has been the target of criticism, and with expanded duties
its problems have increased. There has been constructive criticism helping to
secure improvement of the law and better performance by the Comnission, but
there has also been the expected self-serving criticism. Any other agency which
undertook to perform the same functions with the same zeal for protection and
advancement of the parties' rights would experience the same attacks. The very
power of the Commission, based on a strong law, makes it the target of some
who desire a different dispensation in transportation. The Commission must
face and ride out these storms, whatever their volume and character. It can
do no more.
It would seem that a basic test of "viability" is to be found in the attitude of
Congress toward the Commission. There have been criticisms, of course, but
there have been important recent expressions of confidence. The author states:
"The increase in the Commission's viability was marked by a steady stream of
legislation increasing its power" from 1906 to 1914. -53 What, then, we may ask,
about the legislation which has increased the Commission's duties in recent
years and proposals to place added responsibilities on it? Here we find evidence
of "viability" and an answer to the author's allegations of loss of leadership.
DR. HUNTINGTON'S PROPOSA.
Dr. Huntington's remedy for the supposed "marasmus"--a creature of ex-
ploitation of criticisms of the Commission, neglect of essential facts, and mis-
understanding of the Commission's work-is to place the Commission in the
Department of Commerce, divide it into three commissions (rail, motor, and
water), whose policy determinations would be subject to the will of the Secretary
of Commerce.254 This proposal is made to stand or fall on whether the Com-
mission has been an impartial tribunal. The reader must be the judge of the
validity of Dr. Huntington's finding on this subject. All that has been said in
these pages bespeaks a different conclusion. The Commission does not have a
perfect record of performance; it is not infallible. Its every endeavor, however,
has been to abide by the spirit and the letter of the law it administers*-Y
253. Huntington, p. 471 n.16.
254. Huntington, pp. 503-09.
255. "[T]here is no charge that the Commission is biased or unfair; Ln the contrary
the testimony appears to be unanimous that the Commission acts without favor to or pre-
judice against any litigant or interest." A'rrommy GE- Uu's Coi:itrrrm, REun,:v oN AD-
minsTnls A PRoc.uTRE Im GovE M ENT AGENCIES, SEN. Doc. No. S, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
59-60 (1941).
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On the other hand, Dr. Huntington's proposal would put an end to inde-
pendent, nonpolitical consideration of transportation problems and would
introduce a separatism in the regulation of different modes of transportation
which conflicts with the very essence-the highly competitive nature-of
present day transportation.
Possibly the best means of pointing up both the unwisdom and unreality
of Dr. Huntington's proposal is to state that sources he cites as authority on
other matters fail him completely in his attack on the independence of the
Commission 256 and that the Secretary of Commerce has rejected any proposal
to transfer regulatory work to that Department.25 7 Dr. Huntington's notion
that the dispensation he proposes would end "the existing artificial distinction
and conflict between promotional and regulatory policies" is too naive to war-
rant discussion.
Dr. Huntington's article appears to derive from the thinking of a small
group of political scientists and others who have sought to get rid of the
"independent commission." It seems strange that students of government,
with their knowledge of the way our political institutions have developed,
should desire to tear down a unique and democratic contribution to the hand-
ling of the complex and technical problems with which Congress can not deal
directly and which transcend the knowledge and capacity of our courts. The
administrative type of agency grew up to meet a definite need, and on the
256. All of the possible citations cannot be referred to, but the following two suffice:
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION, TASK FORcE REPORT ON REGuLAoRY CoMMissioNs
83-4 (1949) : "Most carriers, shippers, and students of transportation appear to agree that
the independent status of the Commission should be maintained. That independence is quite
real and has a definite and important effect upon the development of transportation policy.
Major rate controversies have severe political repercussions; sectional and group interests
are deeply involved in such proceedings. In the hands either of the legislature or the Execu-
tive, their solution would tend to become trials of political strength."
Testimony of Wilbur J. La Roe, Jr., Hearings, supra note 215, at 207: "The Congress
was deliberate in setting up the Interstate Commerce Commission as an independent agency.
... Through all the years the Commission has been entirely divorced from politics, and this
has been one of its greatest elements of strength."
See also CommIssIoN ON ORGANIZATION, STAFF REPORT To ComMrrran ON INDLPENDENT
REGuLAToRY CoMMISSIONS IV-46 (1948) : "The Interstate Commerce Commission should be
continued as an independent agency in order to ensure flexible regulation with the minimum
of political influence." And see COOPER, ADMINIiSTRATIvE AGENCIES AND THE COUtS
(1951).
257. "The Office of the Under Secretary for Transportation has no regulatory function.
It does not seek or desire it. The Department as a whole has no such function, except fi
international ocean and international air transportation. Regulatory activity is a quasi-
judicial activity; it is and should be exercised by independent agencies." Address by Secre-
tary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, "The Government's Role in Transportation," April
29, 1952.
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whole it has met this need. Its success depends on its independent, non-
political action under the general directions given it by the legislative branch,
subject to judicial review and presidential appointment. Dr. Huntington would
destroy this independence and thus eliminate this type of agency. Fortunately,
this school of thought finds little support among the interests subject to
regulation, the shippers, the members of Congress, or among well-informed
students of the regulatory process.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL












Note and Comment Edit,
DAVID T. BAZELON
GEORGE BERLSTEIN















ANDREW D. HEINEMAN, Bus. AMOr.
IMMANUEL KOHN
RICHARD I. M. KELTON
JEROME S. WAGSHAL
Editor in Military Service
BARRY H. GARFINKEL, Managing Editor
MARIE MCMAHON
Business Secretary
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
ROBERT T. A. Mou.oY. B.S. 1938, City College of New York. LL.B. 1941, Yale
University. Member, New York Bar; Section of Taxation, American Bar Association.
Co-author, The Revenue Act of 1948, 34 VA. L. REV. 501, 662 (1948). Associated with
the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley, New York City.
RoBERT L. WOODFORD. LL.B. 1939, St. John's University. Member, New York Bar;
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Co-author: The Revenue Act of 1948,
34 VA. L. REv. 501, 662 (1948). Associated with the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hope
& Hadley, New York City.
CHAR.ES S. MORGAN. A.B. 1914, University of Michigan. Ph.D. 1920, Yale Uni-
versity. Formerly economist, Institute of Economics (Brookings Institution) ; director,
Section of Research, Federal Coordinator of Transportation; assistant director, Bureau
of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission. Author: REGUI.ATION AND TriP
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1923); co-author: THE ST. LAWRENCE NAVIGATION
AND POWER PROJECT (1929); director and principal author: PUBLIC AIDS To TRANS-
PORTATION, PROBLEMS IN THE REGULATION OF DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION By WATER
(1940). Chief carrier research analyst, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics,
Interstate Commerce Commission.
